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H.M.MOOMAW 
ROANOKE, VIRGINIA 
COLONIAL AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK BUILDING 
·In the ar-gum.eat yesteJtday, 4wa ·at least to some 
extfnl to the preesUN ot ts.e. we failed to mention 
01." ,a,.'Pbastae several ea.sea which we conat.dff fd#Jh-'t be 
he-1pfu:1 to the Court ta anlving at its deels1oa 1n 
the ab~ve ease. 
We attach hereto a letter addP.essri to the COl'U't. ln 
whtch thPee ca.ea are listed. W111 you ~Ir ahow thta 
letter to Boa~ E4war4 w. Bwtsin,, CbS.et- Just1ee1 8ll4 it he and the o:owt does not de• lt trrei$llu or ap.ppet" 
we w0ll14 lla to have the attaehe4 letter ftlecl with the 
rec~ in this case, . otherw1se d1a,po.ee ot tho attache4 
letter as JOU thld tlii .• 
1mmnht· 
enc. c.;o.-
mr. o,.B.K•ter 
!al'• Randolph &.Whittle. 
' 
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February 261 1948 
'!o the Bonora?Jle Ch1ot Justice and the Just1ees 
ot the Supreme ·oow:-t ot YlqlaSa 
Rea Oit7 of Roanoke va. B.J.»•ehws 
Reoo r4 lo. 33'16 
On yeate~da7 1n the wal Ugll!!lcmt of the above oase % taUeci, due 
to the ati-a1n·ot presal.D'e ot time, to refer u anphaelze thstee ease 
as I had tul.17 1ntaade4. These oaaea we teel ma7 be helpful lo the 
Court 1n arriving at lts 4ec1sim. · 
The cases are, 
(1) 
(2) 
(8) 
... lean i;ir +r& Va• Battle, 181 Ve.. l•l&; 1n Lili tL O&UI' .·· · an opiaion b7 lllstioe IPP&tley, 
held. that the taxable subject9 in a oaae ot a 
sales tax on sale of gaaol.iae to airplanes engaged 
1n interstate c.tOllDle:,,ee and f17ing ove:tt Vil'g1n1a and 
uing air fields PJ'OV1ded b7 the state was the bene-
tt.t or privilege of u.alng tac1lit1es prov·l4e4 by the 
State. lad the,.e been no pnV11ege ori benefit as 
distingu1ahe4 from a CGDWloa right pxaovt4e4 by the 
state the taztng statute would have been 1nvsl14. 
Quu,~beru YSo Hall, .159 va. 1'14-2'7,, ls& s.E. 382. fl~ ·oasi oonet•uea oase ( 11) 1n Seotion es of the 
Oonatltut;lon of V:lrgmla whSah prohibits lGOal end 
s9&01al laws tor een4u.otlag eleettone er des1gaat1ng 
places et vetiag and -4eftnea~~ldea1 laW an4 hoMa 
the aat of the le~1slatve preaez,lbtng a method ot 
·eon4uottng eleoticm 1a Canel County, Vlrgin1a to be 
a local or special law end 1nval1d because oontn~ te 
· See. ·~'ot the Con.st1tu.tl.on. Case (s). seetion 63, 
ot the Constitutloa prohibits local cu·• special laws 
"tor tbe assessment and ooileet um ot 11.aaea" and 11 
subJeot to the same eonatru.otian as Case (11) as he14 
1n Q.ld.aeub-orr1 vs. Ball, StQ>ra. 
T9flor vs. 181th, 140 Va. 2181 184 s.s. 239, ~)11ch 1a 
aeadiag ea,se and which holda that wltb. l'eap(fot to the 
~1ghts s•ranteed by the bill ot rSghta "the dstent or 
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the s1:a,e•a powel' la that ot regulation." We l!'efe• 
to pages se and 39 ot the z,eoor4 ln the hletauit •aae. 
Heapoottully aubmlg\e4• 
Mr. C .B.ll'Qnt&r 
MJ-. Randolph ct. Wl11t1sle 
,/ 
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IN THE 
· Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3375 
"' CITY OF ROANOKE,. Plaintiff in Error, 
versits 
HAROLD JOSEPH DONCKERS, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR .ON BEHALF OF 
. THE CITY OF ROANOKE, VIRGINIA. . 
(Italics supplied unless otherwise indicated.) 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Justices of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Vit-ginia: 
Your petitioner, the City of Roanoke, respectfully repre-
sents that it is aggrieved by a final judgment rendered by the 
Hustings Court for the City of Roanoke, Virginia, on the 
2"" •3rd day of October, 1947, in the case of City of Roanok~ 
v. Harold Joseph Donckers, whereby an ordinance of 
the City of Roanoke imposing a tax on the sale of real estat~ 
was held invalid, and, as a result, the defendant was acquitted 
of the charge of violating the ordinance. · 
Your petitioner is advised and represents unto your Hon-
ors that said judgment is erroneous and that it is aggrieved 
thereby as hereinafter set forth. 
A duly certified copy of the record is herewith filed. 
(The parties will be referred to as in the trial court.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, with-
out the intervention of a jury. · 
The sole issue is the question of the validity of an ordi-
nance of the City of Roanoke imposing a tax on the sale of 
real estate 'at the rate of $1.00 on every $100.00 or fraction 
thereof of the consideration. 
The defendant purchased certain real estate in the City· of 
Roanoke and did not pay the tax in the amount and at the 
Lime and in the manner prescribed by the ordinance. The ordi-
nance provides that the tax shall be paid. by the vendee by 
the purchase from the city treasurer of adhesive stamps, and 
shall be due and payable at the time the deed conveying the 
property is offered for recordation in the clerk's office; 
· 3"' and stamps in the requisite *amount of the tax imposed 
are required to be affixed to the deed and cancelled; 
Punishment is provided for violation of the ordinance. 
The defendant was convicted when tried in the Civil and 
Police Justice's · Court, but acquitted on his appeal to the 
Hustings Court of the City of Roanoke. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The action of the trial court in declaring the ordinance in-
valid and acquitting the defendant is assigned· as error. 
POSITION OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE. 
The city claims that the ordinance is a valid exercise of its 
taxing powers and that it in nowise conflicts with any con-
stitutional or statutory prohibition. 
POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The defendant claims that the ordinance conflicts with the 
Bill of Rights ( Article 1, Section 1, Virginia Constitution). 
He further claims that the tax is a property tax, and since 
an ad valorem tax is assessed each year against all real estate 
and the tax imposed by the ordinance is not chargeable against 
all owners of real estate, but only against those purchasing 
real estate, the ordinance violates the rule as to uniformity 
and, is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. The or-
4* dinance is claimed *to be bad because it was passed as 
an emergency ordinance. The amount of the tax is 
claimed to be unreasonable. 
City of Roanoke v. Harold Joseph Donckers 3 
ARGUMENT. 
The Sovereign Power to Tax. 
The power of taxation is an inherent attribute of state 
r;overeignty. It is unlimited except as restricted by the state 
and federal constitutions. It is the strongest of an the pow-
ers of government, being the power ·to destroy; and its prov-
ince cannot be .invaded by the courts. When the question 
· comes before the courts, .it is not a question of policy, but of 
power. See Michie's Digest, Vol 9, pages 423 and 425 and 
cases therein cited. 
It will be observed that the power of the state to tax, 
whether the tax be a direct levy on property or an excise 
tax, is unlimited except as restricted by constitutional limi-
tations. 
It is true that Virginia has no general sales tax, but for 
years it has imposed a tax on the sale of gasoline. That 
Virginia has the power to levy a general sales tax is gen-
erally conceded, and it is eommon knowledge that many of 
its citizens advocate that the General Assembly provide for 
such a tax. 
A diligent reading of the constitutions of Virginia and of 
the United States discloses no prohibition against the levy-
ing of a sales tax by the Commonwealth. Therefore, un-
5• less *the court holds that Virginia cannot impose a sales 
tax, this case becomes comparatively simple and there if!! 
no occasion to examine authorities from other states, because 
the answer lies in determining what taxing powers have been 
delegated to the municipality by the General Assembly. 
The General Power of the City to Tax. 
It cannot be disputed that the General Assembly "has full_ 
power to confer authority on local authorities to impose taxes 
for local purposes, except as limited by the federal or state 
constitutions". Gilkersoti v. Frederick Justices, 13 Gratt. 
577; Bradley "<t Co. v. Richmond, 110 Va. 521, affirmed 227 U. 
S. 477, 33 S. Ct. 318, 57 L. Ed. 603. See also Michie's Digest, . 
Vol. 9, page 425. 
The specific taxing- authority of the City of Roanoke is 
found in sub-section 1 of section 2 of its charter (Acts 1942, 
p. 958), which is as follows: 
"(1) To raise annually by taxes and assessments in said 
city such sums of money as the council hereinafter provided 
4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for shall deem necesary for the purposes of said city, and in 
such manner as said council sl1all deem expedient, in accord-
:mce with the Constitution and laws of this State and of the 
United States * * * . " 
If, indeed, the foregoing charter provision needs any in-
tei·pretation as to the extent of the power of taxation therein 
conferred, the court can find it in City of Norfolk v.' Norfolk 
Lcvndrnark, etc., Co., 95 Va. 564. The charter provisjon 
6,.. therein *quoted on pag·es 566 and 567 provides that the 
city council shall '' raise, annually, by taxes and assess-
ments, in said city, such sums of money as they shall deem 
necessary to defray the expenses of the same, and in such 
manner as they shall deem expedient, in accordance with the 
constitution and laws of this State and of the United States". 
It will be noted that the wording is the same as that in the 
Roanoke charter, except that the appropriate pronoun ts used 
for "council'' in the Norfolk charter. In that case the Su-
preme Court of Appeals, in referring to the provision last 
quoted herein, said : 
'' This language has been construed by this court, and held 
to confer the general power of taxation, except only as it may 
be limited by tl1e laws of· the State, or of the United States, 
and tv inc_lude all powers a.nd subjects of taxation." Carring-
ton v. City of Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464; Hit1nphreys v. City of 
Norfolk, 25 Gratt. 97. 
"When the legislature confers upon a municipality the 
gene1:al power of taxation, it grants all the power possessed 
by itself in respect to the imposition of taxes, and the city 
can then impose taxes, in its disctetion, upon all subjects 
within its jurisdiction not withheld from taxation by the leg-
islature, whether they be taxed by the State or not." 
In the instant case we have a charter provision exactly like 
another which has been construed by the highest court of the 
State to grant the general power of taxation to a munici-
pality . 
. It is, therefore, plain that tlle Council of the City of Roa-
noke can levy such taxes, in its discretion as it may see fit, 
upon all subjects within its jurisdiction not withheld from 
taxation by the legislature or the Constitution, whether they 
be taxed by the State or not. 
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7• «:Limitations on Taxing Power Not Applicable in. This 
Case. 
There are numerous restrictions in· the Constitution and 
statutes on the taxing power, such as the prohibition against 
the state's taxation of real estate and tangible personal prop-
erty (Sec. 171 of the Constitution); the prohibition ·against 
political subdivisions imposing a tax on incomes (Sec. 35 of 
the Tax Code) ; and the prohibition against local license taxa-
tion of insurance companies ( Sec. 293 of the Tax Code). How-
. ever, there is no statement in the Constitution, general laws 
or in the charter of the City of Roanoke that expressly or im-
pliedly says that sales shall not be taxed. 
When a prohibition is not found in the tax laws, or their 
framework and general arrangement, there is no solid ground 
to pronounce an ordinance imposing a tax void. Any infrac-
tions must be clear and palpable. Commonwealth v. United 
Cigarntte Machine Co., 120 Va. 835. · 
The defendant relies on City of Pensacola v. Lawrence, 171 
So. 793 (Fla.), holding an ordinanc.e imposing a tax of 2% 
on real estate sales void. The sole reason for the holding 
was that the court could find no power to levy the tax in any 
statute including the city's charter. Neither the court nor 
the attorneys gave any consideration to constitutional pro-
visions, but confined themselves to a consideration of what 
powers of taxation bad actually been granted to the city by 
the· legislature, and the case turned on that point ex-
8* elusively, •and the court held that the leg·islature had 
limited the city in the imposition of excise taxes to a tax 
on occupations and privileges. 
In the instant case there is no statute limiting· tbe power 
of the City of Roanoke to tax except in certain specific· in-
stances, such as prohibitions against levying an income tax 
or levying a license tax on newspapers. It is fair to assume 
that had the legislature intended t-0 limit further the broad 
taxing power of the City of Roanoke, it would have done so 
in plain language. 
The Pensa.cola case does not strengthen defendant's cause . 
as this court has on manv occasions said that where broad 
grants of taxing power bave been made to cities, those grants 
include all powers and subjects of taxation except only such 
as '' may be limited by the laws of the State or the United 
States''. In other words, the grant is general and one must 
look for and find specific exceptions or conflicts in order to 
make a successful attack. 
The cry of the defendant that City ()f Norfolk v. Norfolk 
L(llfl,dniark, 95 Va. 564, is obsolete, because of the new Con-
6 Supreme Court of A.ppeals of Virginia 
·stitution, is hushed by the quotations therefrom in Fred-
ericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery C'o., 168 Va. 57, decided in 
1937. On page 69, the court reaffirmed what was said in the 
. earlier case by quoting with approval: 
"When the legislature confers upon a municipality 
9* the general powers of taxation, *it grants all the powers 
possessed by itself in respect to the imposition of taxes; 
and the city coo then impose taxes in, its discretion upon all 
subjects within its jurisdiction not ivithheld from taxa.tion by 
the legislature, whethe·r they be taxed by the State or not.'~ 
It will be observed from the foregoing that '' subjects of 
taxation'' are not confined to property taxes, because the sub-
ject of taxation in that case was u license. 
The defendant says that the ordinance is unconstitutional. 
We look to the Constitution of the State, not for grants of 
power, but for limitations. Commonwealth v. United Ciga-
rette Machine Co., s'ltpra. Therefore, if, as above shown, the 
General Assembly granted to the City of Roanoke full gen-
eral taxing power and there has been no clear infraction of 
the Constitution, the tax is not prohibited thereby. An ordi-
nance such as the one under attack stands on the same foot-
ing as. an act of the legislature. Norfolk v. Griffith-Powell 
Co., 102 Va. 115, Gordan v. Newvort News, 102 Va. 649. And 
the burden is on the party charging invalidity~ Norfolk, <tc., 
Co. v. City of Norfolk, 105 Va. 139. · 
The Tax Is a Valid Excise. 
Although the burden is on the defendant to show the tax 
illeg·al, the City of Roanoke, because of the importance of 
this case, proposes to go somewhat beyond that which it is 
called ·upon to do and clinch for all time its right and power 
to seek new and additional sources of revenue however novel 
may be the taxes imposed. It is recognized everywhere 
10• that *direct property taxes are sufficiently high in most 
localities, and if new sources of revenue are not found, 
municipal g·overnments will cease to function as they should. 
It is, therefore, imperative that more and more excise taxes 
will have to be levied. · 
The tax imposed on the sale of real estate by the City of 
Roanoke is an excise tax. 
'' An excise'' in its original sense, was something cut off 
from the price. paid on a sale of goods as a contribution to 
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the support of the government, but in its broader meaning 
it includes every form of taxation which is not a burden laid 
directly upon persons or property (Biickstaff, &c., v. 111/cKin-
ley, 127 S. W. (2) 802 (Ark.)), whereas, a property tax is a 
visitational tax (Bmnis Hardivoocl Lu1nber Co. v. Graham 
County, 198 S. E. 843 (N. C.) ). See also 128 A. L. R. 894, 
et seq. 
There can he no question but what the State, as well as its 
municipalities, can impose excise taxes. For years, the State 
and its municipalities have been levying excise taxes, e. g., 
license taxes, income taxes and sales taxes. The Common-
wealth has imposed license taxes of various kinds for many 
years, and lately an income tax. The cities and towns have 
relied g-reatly upon such excises as taxes on business licenses, 
on franchises and on motor vehicles to augment their reve-
nues. And it is probable that new excise taxes will be levied 
from time to time. 
This brings to the fore the question: Is an excise 
11 * *tax a tax on property t 
. The foregoing definition of the term ''excise'' nulli-
fies any claim that it is a property tax. The point is set at 
rest-in the case of H1.tlftt01'11 v. CommonweaUh, 166 Va. 229, 183 
S. E. 873, wherein it was claimed that because certain stock 
was exempt from taxation the income therefrom was also ex-
empt, for the reason that a tax levied on the income is a 
tax on the shares of stock, and that a tax on income is a tax 
on the property or source from which the income is derived. 
The earlier cases seem to support the view that excises, 
such as income taxes, were a tax on property, but Justice 
Eggleston in the Hunton case reviews the authorities and 
concludes that an income tax. is not a tax on the property 
source of income. He clearly draws the line with the state-
ment: "The tax is not levied on property but on the in-
dividual upon and with respect to his entire net income. * * * 
We think the fundamental weakness in petitioner's case is 
his theory that any tax which affects property in any way, 
directly or indirectly, is a tax on that property. This argu-
ment is not sound and has been expressly repudiated by this 
court'''. He then proceeds to say that an inheritance tax is 
not a tax on property, nor is a license tax, nor is an auto-
mobile license tax. 
The defendant claims that all excise taxes are privilege 
taxes. Documentary stamps on all deeds, bonds and stock 
sales are required by the United States tax statutes. 
12~ These taxes •are on the transactions involved, whether 
it be a purchase by a veteran of a home, or by an indi-
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vidual of a share of stock. ( See Section 901, 902 and 906a, 
Title 26, Federal Code Annotated for illustrations.) It can-
not be claimed that such are privileg·e taxes. · 
An income tax is an excise tax (Hitnton v. Common'Wealth, 
166 Va. 229). Certainly, no privilege is taxed _thereunder. 
Income taxes apply whether the income is derived through 
labor or investments. The tax on the purchase of a share of 
stock is not a tax on a privilege, but on the transaction. 
That some excise taxes apply to privileges does not mean 
that all excise taxes are on privileges, and it is not claimed 
by the city that the tax in question is a privilege tax. The 
tax is on a transaction, to-wit, the sale of real estate, and not 
on the right to purchase or own property. This distinction 
should be kept clearly in mind. 
Reasonableness of Tax. 
This is a matter which the court should leave to the legis-
lative body. The injustice of the enforcement of a revenue 
statute can be remedied only by the legislative power. 51 
Am. J ur. 73, note 2, and following section 43. The amount of 
an excise tax is in the discretion of the legislative body. 51 
Am .• Tur. 114, note 5, Bradley v. Richrnond, 110 Va. 521, at 
575. 
13* *Before the courts will interfere and declare a tax 
unreasonable, a flagrant case of excessive and oppres-
sive abuse of power by the municipality in the levying of the 
tax must be established. The power is legislative and so is 
the amount. 38 Am. Jur. 42 (Sec. 352), citing Bradley v. 
Riclwiond, 110 Va. 521, 227 U. S. 477, 57 L. Ed. 603, 33 S. Ct. 
318, and Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 168 Va. 57. 
The tax in question is 1 % of the value of the property 
purchased, and, at best, all the defendant. can claim is that 
the reasonableness of the amount is debatable. "If the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of a statute or ordinance is fairly 
debatable, the court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and 
responsibility of deciding the question.'' Martin v. City of 
Danv-ille, 148 Va. 247. 
In Bradley v. Richmond, 110 Va. 521, at page 525, the court 
said: 
''The power of taxation, under our system of government, 
rests with the legislative and not with the judicial department, 
and its province cannot be invaded by_ the courts. Where the 
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power to tax for revenue purposes exists, the amount of the 
tax is in the discretion of the legislative body, and it may be 
carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or 
corporation which imposes it which the will of such State or· 
corporation may prescribe. If the power is exercised in an 
unwise, unjust and oppressive manner to any particular class, 
the remedy, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal, 
not to the courts, but to the justice and patriotism of the rep-
resentatives of the people.'' 
14• •Tlze Tax i~c: Not Double Taxation. 
It is insisted that the sales tax imposed by the ordinance 
is double taxation, as real est.ate is already burdened by a 
direct ad valo,rem tax thereon. The courts of this State have 
repeatedly held that it i8 uot double taxation to impose a 
license tax on a business and at the same time to tax the 
capital used therein. lJrad/.ey v. R-iclrnwnd, supra. "The 
principle that the imposition of both an ex~ise tax on a privi-
lege, activity,, occupation or calling and :m ad valorem tax 
on property used in the exercise, conduct, or performance of 
such calling, privilege or actiYity is not invalid as double 
taxation is generally recognized. 51 .Am. ,Tur. 345, section 
292. This phase of the case i~ also settled by Hunton v. Com-
nionwealth, supra, .holding that a tax on income from stock 
is not a tax on the stock. 
The defendant cited Nicllnls v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 43 L. 
Ed. 786, as holding that a tax on sales at exchanges, only, 
is a privilege tax. This is correct beeanse of the peculiar 
circumstances, and the tnx was upheld. It uppears, how-
ever., that the principal purpo~e of eiting the case was to 
inject a statement from the opinion that a tax on a sale was 
'' really and practically'' h tax on property. The case wa-s 
decided in 1899, and the statement referred to was incide11tal. 
Nevertheless, the court's idea was in accord with the earlier 
cases tlrnt excise taxes WE-re taxes on *property, aH 
15* pointed out l~·y Justice J4Jg·g;leston in Hunton v. Co1n1no,,1-
icealth, 166 Va. 22!), wherein be stated that the earlier 
theory had been repudiated. 
Little comfort for the defendant can he derived from Poca-
hontas, etc., v. Crnn'monwr.'nlfh, 1.13 Va. 108. It was important 
for the State 'to show that the recordation tax was not a tax 
on land, land having been segregated for local taxation ( Con-
stitution Sec. 171). In other words, another type of excise 
tax walS lrnld not to he a tax on propert)T although it may be an 
indirect burden incident to acquisition and ownership of 
property. 
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Constitutional Provisions Do Not Deal With Excise Taxes. 
In Hunton v. Com1nnni{)ectlth, 166 Va. 229~ it was said with 
respect to a license tax ('which has been shown to be an ex-
cise) that '' Section 168 of the Constitution provides that 
'all taxes shall be uniform.' In Bradley &. Go. v. Rich'mond, 
110 Va. 521, 525, 66 S. E. 872, 87 4, we said: 'The provisions 
of the Constitution requiring equality and uniformity of taxa-
tion apply only to a direct tax on property, and not to license 
taxes, which clo not admit of a tax strictly equal and uniform 
in the sense contended for * * *.' 
'' If construing sections 168 nnd 170 together we said that 
'all taxes' meant 'all direct taxes on property' to *the 
rn• exclusion of license taxes, then it is equally true ·that 
· 'all other taxes' in section 177 can likewise be construed 
to· mean 'all other d-irect taxes on prope.rty' to the exclusion 
of income taxes.'' Se also Cnmnwnwealth v. Bibee Grocery 
Co., 153 Va. 935. 
It will be observed from the foregoinp:. that sections- 168, 
170 and 179 are not applicable in a discussion of excises, as 
they deal solely with direct taxes on property. 
No other provisions of the Constitution can, by any stretch 
of the imagination, be said to touch upon any prol1ibition of 
the tax in question. As lms been seen, courts do not look to 
the Constitution for grants of power, but only for limitations 
. on power. If there be no limitations therein as to excise taxes 
the tax involved in this case cannot be said to be unconstitu-
tional. 
Eff eat of Failure of Cit;y nr Strite to Hl!reto.fore Tax Sales of 
Real Estate. 
"Mere non-user by a government of its power to levy a 
tax, it. matters not for how long· continued, can never be con-
strued into a forfeiture of the power." The fore~oing quota-
tion is found in CitJJ of Norfolk v. Perry Co., 108 Va. 28., at 
pa~e 32, with respect to a tax leYied by the City of Norfolk. 
It follows that regardless of how novel a tax may be, never-
t}rnless, it may be levied regardless of 110w long the 
17• *exercise of the power to levy it has remained dormant. 
In Frederick.<;bur,q v. Samitary Grocery Co., 168 Va. 
57, at page 68, the court said: "The City of Fredericksburg 
has marked a new way and fonnd a distinct sper.ies, hitherto 
immune from license taxation. as such in this State. to share 
the burdens of the expense ofit~ !?,'overnment." This was an 
outstanding case in which a city found n new way to increase 
its revenues. The mere fact that it Imel failP.d to exercise its 
power and the tax had not hitherto been imposed, was im-
material. · 
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Local Taxes .A.1:e Not Required to be Uni! onn Throughout 
the State. 
The defendant contends that there must be uniformity of 
taxation with respect to all taxation by municipalities through-
out the State. This view is exploded by reference to the 
Fredericksburg- case, 168 Va. at page 69, where the following 
was quoted with approval: 
"If it. (leg·1slature) confers the power of taxation upon a 
municipal corporation, the power so delegated continues un-
til it is recalled., and the mere failure of the legislature to 
exercise a part of its power cannot be construed as an im-
pairment or dimunition of that which it had lawfully dele-
gated to a subordinate agency of taxation, for the ideas of 
propriety, expediencu and 1)(;licJ1 ,which influence all sche·mes 
of taxation 1,ia.y not b,J identical -in the nntnic-ipal councils and 
the legislatit,re of the State.'' 
This means, genera11y, that the municipalities may or may 
not tax what the State taxes and a municipality may tax a 
subject. not taxed by anotlwr. Furthermore. rates of 
18* taxation #.•and assessed values are not the same in all 
cities. "Uniformity of ht.xation ", within the meaning of 
the Constitution, is that State taxes shall be uniform through-
out the State and local taxes shall be uniform withhl the 
locality. Also, subjects of taxation may be classified differ-
ently by localitiess, subject to expressed restrictions, if any, 
and as long- as each class is uniformly taxed, protests are 
without avail. 
Emer,r7enr,y Ordinance. 
Section 5:3 of tlle Constitution forbid1:: nuttinrr statutes 
other tl1an appropriation bills into immediate ope1;ition "un-
less in case of emer~ency (which emer,gency Rha11 be expressed 
in the body of the bill)." It. wns held in CitJJ of Roanoke v. 
Elliott, 123 Va. 393, that it wfls not reanired that tlle -reason~ 
for the emergency should be Rh)ted in the hill hut merely tha1 
there was an emer~enr.y. However., the charter of the Citv 
of Roanoke (Sec. 13) declare~: "An ~mergeucy measure i<;; 
an ordinance or resolution for thP. immediate preservation 
of the public peace, propel'ty, henlth or safety, or provicfol'•: 
for the daily operation of n municipal department in wl1i~h 
the emerg·ency is set forth and clefi11ed in a prearnhle there-
to." Emei-g·ency measures may be passed by a vote of four. 
members of council. 
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As said in City of R()a.1iok~ v. Elliott, s1tpra, the reason for 
stating that a particular act belonged to the emerg·ency class 
was to call that fact to the members of the legislature, not 
of the people, so that they might carefully *examine it 
19* and determine for themselves whether or not the act 
should be so classified. N otfoe to the people of an al-
leg·ed fact they could not controvert would be vain. Likewise 
it can be said that the reason for the setting fprth in the pre-
amble of an ordinance that it is to be of an emergency class, 
and the reasons therefor, is for the information of the council 
and not for the people. Consequently if such reasons are set 
forth in a satisfactory and understa11dable manner to the 
council, with a showing that it is to be for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, property, health or safety, 
or providing for the daily operation of a municipal depart-
. ment, there has been a substantial compliance with the charter 
refluirements. 
The preamble of the ordinance is : 
""Whereas, for the usual daily operation of the municipal 
government., and in order to provide forthwith additional 
revenue for the city's needs, an emergency exists." 
The statement is clear and informative in that more money 
is required forthwith for the usual <laily ope.ration of the 
g·overnnment of tbe Citv o:f Roanoke. and to meet the citv's 
needs, and because of tl1is an emergency exists. "' 
Some courts have held that the declaration in an ordinance 
that it is an emergency measure i8 not conclusive upon the 
courts (37 Am .• Jur. 765). It is believed, however, in the 
light pf the decision in City of Ror..·,1.0ke v. Elliott, S1J1,pra, 
that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia would 
20* *rule with other jurisdictions that the question of an 
emer~·ency is for the determination of t11e council and 
iA not subject to review by the coul't$. See 96 A. L. R., be-
g-inning at page 779. It will be noted tl1at in most of the juris:-
dictions wberein declarations of emergency are reviewable 
hy the courts, ordinances other than emergency ordinances 
are sub;ect to a referendum vote. nr1d it is for that reason the 
ileclarations are reviewable. The wdght of authoritv else-
where is that such declarations are conclusive on the courts. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted that the ordinanr.e of the City 
of Roanoke imposing the tax on real estate saleE! is valid in 
suhstance, and that such validity is not affected because it 
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was passed as an emergency measure. Therefore, the trial 
court erred in its judgment. 
PRAYER. 
Your petitioner prays that a writ of error to the judgment 
complained of may be awarded your petitioner, in order that 
said judgment, for the cause of error aforesaid, before you 
may be caused to come., that the whole matter of said judg-
ment contained may be re·-hea rd, and that said judgment may 
be reversed and annulled. 
21 * '~STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE IX. 
Counsel for the City of Roauoke states that a copy of this 
petition was on tbe 10th day of Dcc~mber, 1947, mailed to 
opposing counsel in the trial court, and that this petition was 
filed on the 10th day of December, 1947, with .Justice Herbert 
B. Gregory, at Roanoke, and further, that should a writ of 
error be awarded, this petition is adopted as the opening 
brief on behalf of said city. 
ORAL HEARING REQUESTED ON PETITION. 
Counsel for the Citv of Roanoke desireR to state oral!v the 
reasons for reviewing· the decision complained of, and re-
spectfully requests that opportnnity be afforded therefor. 
CITY OF ROANOKE, VIRGINIA, 
By C. E. HUNTER, 
Counsel. 
Roanoke, Virginia, Decembr,r 10th, l!J47. 
I, C. E. Hunter, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my 
opinion there is error to the judgment entered on the 3rd 
day of October, 1947, in the Hustings Court of tl1e City of 
Roanoke against said city and in favor of Harold Joseph 
22* •nonckers, as set forth in the foregoing· petition, for 
which the same should be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
C. E. HUNTER. 
Filed 12-10-4 7. 
H.B. G. 
lan. 6. 1948. "'\Vrit of error a-warded hy the court. No bond 
required. 
M.B. W. 
Page 
Statement of Case ................................. 1•-2• 
Position of Defendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3* 
Grounds of Objection to ·writ of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3* 
Objection No. 1-No Right of .A.ppeal ......... .4*-5*-6""-7* 
Objection No. 2-Property Tax ................... 7f:t; to 14* 
Objection No. 3----Power to Levy Sales Tax Never Dele-
gated to City ................ · .............. 14* to 28• 
Objection No. 4-0rdinance Violates Constitution---Sub-
ject Taxed Not Proper Subject to Taxation .... 28* to 36* 
Objection No. 5-0rdinance Contrary to Section 13 of 
City Charter Defining· Emergency 1\foasures ... 36* to 37* 
Conclusion and Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 37* -38* 
Statement Required by Ru1c IX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38* 
Statement As Appellee 's Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388 
Citation of Cases 
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Ya. 560 ............... 19* 
Arey v. Lindsey, 103 Va. 250, 48 S. E. 889 ............... 22*' 
Bem-is v. Graham c,,., 198 S. E. 843 .................... 24* 
Buckstaff v. McKinley, 127 S. W. (2) 802 .............. 25* 
Beebe v. State (Ind.), 63 .Am. Dec. 391-400 ............. 30e 
Commonwealth v. "H'ilfrox., 1.11 Va. 849-852............. 5* 
Common,wealth' v. Perrow, 124 V>1. 805................. 5* 
Coffin Bros. v. Barnett, 72 Led. 768-9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8'~ 
City of Riclmiond v. Drewry-Hu,qhes Co., 122 Va. 178; 94 
S. E. 989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27# 
Dawson v. Kentiickv DistiUcries Co., 255 U.S. 288; 65 L. 
Ed. 634-638 . . . . .......................... 10* -2fr» -:~O* 
Danville 7'. & P. Co. Y. Da.nv-illP,, 168 Va. 430-435. . . . . . . . 19* 
Dwncan Campbell v. Bryant, J.llavor, 104 Va. 509-513; 5~ 
S. E. 638 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22* 
Eat01i v. Boston, 12 Am. St. Hep .. 147 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8* 
Fulker.~on v. Bristol, 105 Va. 555 ...................... J9e!t· 
Fredericksburg Y. Sanitary Gro. ro., 168 Va. fi7 ........ 21 ,y: 
Hicks v. Bristol, 102 Va. 861, 47 S. E. 100 .............. 21:li< 
Hampton v. Ins. Co. of N. Am .• 177 Va. 494 ............ 10* 
Hunton v. C01n., 166 Va. 229. 183 S. FJ. 873 ...... 22*-23'11:-24* 
ln Re Opinion of Justice (l\Iass~), 84 N. E. 499 ......... 34,a. 
K eon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137-142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8* 
16 Index to Petition-continued 
Page 
Leesb·urg v. Loudon Co., 181 Va. 279-284 ............... 18* 
Low v. Rees Print. Co., 59 N. ·w. 362-366. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 • 
Mclmniss v. McKay, 141 A. 699 ..... ·................. 3• 
McKay v. Mclnniiss, 279 U. S. 820, 73 L. Ed. 975. . . . . . . . 8* 
Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509. 43 L. Ed. 786-794 ...... 11*-13• 
Norfolk v. Griffin, 120 Va. 524-535 ..................... 17~ 
Norfolk v. Nor.folk Landmark, 95 Va. 564 .............. 20• 
On1,key v. 111 organs, 65 L. Ed. 837. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8"" 
Pocahontas Consol Colleries v. Com., 11:3 Va. 108-112~ 73 
S. E. 446 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 • 
Pensacola v. Lawrence (Fla.), 170 So. 793-795 .......... 31 * 
Pollock v. Fanners' L. & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 
759 ............................................ 24• 
Queens Co. TVater Co. v. Mon-roe, 83 App. Div. 105, 82 
N. Y. Supp. 610 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26* 
St. F'llr. Co. v. Annour, 177 N. E. 702-703 ............ 8*-13* 
8/icdd v. Patterson (Ill.), 144 N. E. 5-6................ 8* 
St. Lewis v. Hill (Mo.), 22 s: W. 861-862.............. 8* 
Strang v. Van Camp, ] 92 N. "\V. 760. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9* 
So. Rv. Co. v. Richnwnd, 175 Va. 308, 8 S. E. (2d) 271. ... 19* 
Standard Oil Co. v. FrerlP.rickslmr.fJ, 105 Va. 82 ••.••..•• 22,ffo 
State v. Julow, 31 S. vV. 782., 29 L. R. A. 257 50 Am. St. 
Rep. 443 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 • 
Taylor v. Sniith, 140 Va. 217,124 S. E. 239 ..... : ..... _33•~34• 
Thomvson v. Krcntzrw, 72 Ro. 891. .................. 8*-30* 
Thomvson v. McLeod (Miss.), n ~o. 193 ............ 10•-29• 
Town of 'lVvthet'·ille v. ,lohnu1n's Ex.or., 108 Va. 589, 62 
S. E. 382 .... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20* 
Va. T:Vholesale Co. v. Apzwlachia, 131 Va. 357, 108 S. E. 
660 .................................... ·, ....... 27• 
Y oU'n.Q v. Com., 101 Va. 853, 45 S. E. 327. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 • 
Statutes Cited 
Constitution of Virginia 
Sec. 8 ......................... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . 4• _5•-6• 
Sec. 88 ....................................... 4*-5* 
Sec. 168 ........................... 1•-1.3*-16*-21 •-26• 
Sec. 117 . . . . ................................. 21 * -22* 
Sec. 63 ........................................ 21• 
Corn~titution of Virginia, 
Bill of Rights-Sec. 1. · ................. , . . . . . . . . 21 • 
Code of Virginia 
Sec. 4743 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4• 
Sec. 4931 ..................................... 4•-5• 
Index to Petition-continued 17 
Page 
Tax Code of Va., Charter 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7* 
Tax Code, Sec. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16• 
Title to Tax Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19* 
Charter of City of Roanoke. Sec. 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36• 
Digests & Other Authorities 
19 Am. & En. ]~~uc. Law 284 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8* 
Lewis ~m. Dom. S. S. 57-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8* 
51 Am. ,Jnr., p. 57, Sec. 29, p. 55 S. 28 ................ 8*-9* 
R. C. Law Am. Cas. 1918, 678. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9• 
11 Am. tTur., p. 724, S. 95. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9* 
Cooley's Mui1. Corp., S. 137 .......................... 27• 
50 Am. St. Rep. 443 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31* 
26 R. C. L .. p. 209, p. 236. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 * 
Coolev on Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34" 
Amer·. Bar Assn. ,Journal, Sept., 1947, pp. 887-966. . . . . . 34• 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
.AT RICHMOND. 
RECORD NO. 3375 
CITY OF ROANOKE, 
versus 
HAROLD .JOSEPH DONCKERS. 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT IN ERROR. 
(Italics s~1pplied unless othc rwise indicated.) 
2'o the Honorable Chief Justir.e and the Jirntices of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
The defendant, Harold Joseph Donckers, objects to the 
awarding of a Writ of Error to th(-l petitioner, from the order 
of the Hustings Court for the City of Roanoke, Virginia, 
2* entered on the ~3rd day of October, 1947, whereby the 
defendant was adjudged not guilty and the warrant 
..,..against him was dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF 'l1HB C ... t\.SE. 
The facts of the cijse are. correctly set forth in the plain-
tiff's petition, except that the ordinance provides that any 
person violating same shall be guilty of a misdem,~an01· and 
upon conviction shall be subject to a fine of not less than 
ten dollars nor more than three hundred dollars or i11-iprison-
ment for a period of not n1ore than tlH'ee months, or to both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
Record, page .... , Section D of ordinance. 
The ordinance (Section 1) imposes a tax of '~one dollar on 
every one hundred dol1nrs or fraction thereof of the consid-
eration of the deed or the achrnl value of the property sold, 
or exchanged, free of any l-ien -i-ndebtedness thereon, which 
ever is greater.' ' 
The effect of this is to impose a tax of one percentum, not 
only, on the interest of the seller in the property but upon 
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the value of the property regardless of the existing Hens there· 
on. By way of illustration., suppose Mr. G. I. owns real es-
tate, subject to the lien of a deed of trust for $9,900.00 and 
sells the property for $100.00 cash, subject to the lien of 
$9,900.00. .All he has to sell is an equity of redemption worth 
$100.00, yet the tax is one percentum of $10,000.00, or $100.00, 
-one hundred percentum of tl1e value of his interest actually 
sold. 
3* *POSITION OF DEFENDANT. 
The position of the defendant is not fully or accurately 
set forth in the plaintiff's petition. The defendant's posi-
tion will appear from the objections and argument herein-
after set forth. 
GROUNDS OF OBJECTION TO vYRIT OF ERROR. 
Defendant respectfully submits tlmt the' petitioner, the 
City of Roanoke, should not he awarded a Writ of Error for 
the following reasons: 
(1) This is a criminal case in which the liberty of the de-
fendant is involved and the Citv of Roanoke does not have 
the rig·ht of appeal. · 
( 2) The tax imposed by the ordinance is a tax on property 
or a '' property tax'' and is not imposed according to the 
ad valorem system of taxation of real estate as required by 
the Constitution and laws of Virginia and results in unequal 
and ummiform taxation on real estate. 
(3) The authority to impose such a tax has never been 
dele.2:ated to the City of Roanokfi. _ 
· ( 4) The ordinance "Violates the Constitution of t]1e United -
States and of Virginia and the laws of "Virginia because the 
subject taxed is not a proper subject of taxation. 
( 5) The ordinance was adopted as an emergency measure, 
contrary to the provisions of Section 13 of the Charter of 
the City of Roanoke. 
4• ~OBJECTION NO. 1. 
Right of City o.f Roan(lke to . ..4 ppeal. 
The ordinance provides that the violation thereof is a mis-
demeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or by both. 
This, therefore_, is a criminal case in which the liberty of the 
defendant is involved. 
The Constitution of Virp:inia, Section 8, provides that a 
m~n shall not '' be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.'' 
·,'-\section 88 of the Constitution provides "no appeal shall 
b/ allowed the Commonwealth in a case involving the life or 
Mbe 1rty of a person, except that an appeal by the Common-
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wealth may be allowed in any ease involving the violation of 
a law relating to State revenue.'' 
The ordinance in question docs not relate to State revenue 
and as we have pointed out the liberty of the def endaut is 
1 involved. 
Section 4773 of the Code of Virginia prohibits a second 
prosecution for the same offense '' nnlcss the C'ase be- for a 
violation of a law relating to State revenue * * *.'' 
Section 4931 (formerly 4052 of Code of 1887) provides 
"that a writ of error shall also lie for any city or town to 
the judgment of any circuit, corporation or lm~tings court, 
from the Supreme Court of Appeals, deelaring any ordinance 
of such city or town to be uncon~titutional or otherwise, in-
valid, exce t where the v · · ·dinance is 
made a nusc emea1 
e City has tbe power, as it claims, to make the 
5* act of the defendant complained of a misdemeanor, it is 
necessarily by virtue of State statute. The express 
words of the statute prohibits an appeal by the City in such 
misdemeanor cases, although its ordinance has been held by 
the trial court as unconstitutional or otherwise invalid and 
although no question as to the liberty of the defendant is in-
volved. 
Furthermore, if the statutes mentioned, or any of them, go 
beyond Sections 8 or 88 of the Virginia Constitution "the 
statute must yield to the Constitution". 
C01n. v. Willcox, 111 Va. 849-852, the court said, "In the 
face of this plain Constitution inhibition (Sec. 88) we can not 
take jurisdiction of a case which involves the life or liberty 
of a person, upon the petition of the Commonwealth". 
We submit that it was never the intention or purpose of 
the Constitution or of the Legislature that the cities or towns 
of the State should have a right of appeal superior or greater 
than that of the State itself. 
In Co·,n. v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, the offense with which Per-
row was charged was punishable only by a fine and did not 
directly imperil his liberty. He was charged with violating 
an ordinance of the Board of Supervisors of Buckingham 
County, Virginia (Supra, p. 808). The court held (page 813), 
'' But wh~tever view may prevail in other jurisdictions, we 
are of the opinion that in this State the rule of putting 
6* any person in *jeopardy more than one time for the same 
offense is to be applied in all criminal cases-regardless 
of the character and degree of punishment'' . 
. Co11i. v. Perrow, Sitpra, page 815, quoted U. S. v. Sanges, 
114 U. S. 310, 36 L. Ed. 445, as follows: "A State has no 
right to a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of a de-
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fendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance 
with express statutes, whether the judgment was rendered 
upon a verdict of acquittal or ttpon. a. determination by .a 
court of a question of law." 
In the next paragraph following said quotation our Court · 
held, '' Having reached the conclusion, we must now decide 
whether the offense with which Perrow was charged involved 
the violation of a State revenue law; and we have no difficulty 
in holding that it does not. The title and preamble of the 
act which he was accused of having violated show very clearly 
that the sole purpose of the enactment was to protect local 
interests in Buckingham Count''. 
Bv the same token it must be said of the Roanoke City or-
dinance that it did not involve a State revenue law within 
the meaning· of Section 88 of our Constitution. The preamble 
of the ordinance and its substance clearly show that the sole 
purpose of the ordinance was for the benefit of local inter-
ests, viz., of the City of Roanoke, and such being the case 
Section 88 of the Constitution allows no appeal. 
Sections 8 and 88 of the Constitution are to be read to-
g·ether and all statutes which purport to ·allow appeals 
1il• must *conform to them. The above two cases clearly 
show the right of appeal lies only where the liberty of 
the defendant is not involved and even then when the law re-
lates to State revenue. It is fundamental that the Common-
wealth cannot give to a city, or its agent, power it. does not 
itself have. · 
QBJECTION NO. 2. 
The Tax bnposed by the Ordinance Is a Property Ta.a; on Real 
Estate, Not lrnposed ir,, Accorda,nce with the Ad Valoreni 
Syste.1n of Taxation as Required by the Constitution and 
Laws of TT frginia, and Results in an Unequal and Un-
u,nif onn Bitrden on Real Estate. 
The Constitution of Virginia,· Section 168, provides that 
all property shall be taxed (with certain exceptions). 
Chapter 18 of the Tax Code of Virginia "Real Estate As-
sessments'' deals fully and exclusively with matters pertain-
ing· to taxation of real estate. It is not necessary to quote 
the provi&ions thereof. All are familiar with the fact that 
under the Constitution and laws of Virginia that real prop-
erty is assessed only according to the ad valorern system of 
taxation and with an annually recuring tax for local pur-
poses. Real property can be taxed in no way other than 
that provided for in the Tax Co,de and the Constitution can-
not and we assume will not be denied. 
It becomes pertinent to inquire "What is property!" in 
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order to determine whether or not the City ordinance imposes 
a property tax. 
"Property is the rig·ht of a person to vossess, use, enjoy 
and dispose of a thing·, without" which absolute property 
s• *could have no existence.'' . 
Eaton v. Boston, 12 Am. St. Rep. 147, "Property includes 
every interest in everything· subject to ownership of man, 
and the right to dispose of that interest is a property right.'' 
St. Fur. Co. v. Arnio1,tr, 177 N. E. 702-703, "Ownetship i's 
not a privilege conferred by g·overnment, but a right which 
government is organized to protect and 'property' is synoy-
1'.Jl.OUS with ownership.'' 
Th01npson v. Krentzer, 72 So. 891 (Miss.). V 
Mclnmiss v. McKay, 141 A. 699, affirmed in Jl,fcl(ay v. Mc-
Inmiss, 279 U. S. 820, 73 L. Ed. 975. 
Ornkey v. Morgans, 65 L. Ed. 837 (U. S.). 
Coffin Bros. v. Barnett, 72 L. Ed. 768-769 (U. S.). 
Keon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137-142. 
Shedd v. Patterson, 312 Ill. 371-144 N. E. 5-6. 
19 Amer. and Eng. Enc. Law, 284, and cases cited. 
Lewis Em. Dom. S. S. 57-59. 
St. Lonis v. Hill (Mo.), 22 S. VV. 861-862. 
Many more authorities to. the same effect might be cited. 
All are to the same effect.· 
The rig-ht to sell or dispose of property is therefore prop-
erty itself or to express it differently, is an element or at-
tribute of property. 
'' A tax on a thing is a tax on all its essential attributes, 
and a tax on essential attributes is a tax on the thing itself." 
51 Am. J ur., p. 57, Sec. 29. 
9* *Strang v. Van Cmnp, 192 N. W. 760. 
Citing· R. C. Law. Am. Oas. 1918 A 678. 
It has been variously stated that the character or nature 
of a particular tax must be determnied by its operation, prac-
tical results and incidents, the legislature not being empow-
ered to change the nature of a tax by mere designation. 
51 .Am. Jur., p. 55, Sec. 28. 
The legislature cannot do indirectly by evasion what it can-
not do dire<:tly. . . · 
11 .Am. J ur ., p. 724, Sec. 95. 
73 Fed. 874. 
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The instant ordinance of the City of Roanoke is an arbi-
trary attempt to evade the limitation of its power and to 
burden real estate, which is· already taxed to the limit fixed 
by its charter, with an unauthorized tax. 
The learned Judge of the Hustings Court of the City of 
Roanoke, who after hearing oral arg·ument and. reading the 
briefs of counsel carefully considered the validity of the or-
dinance in question, decided that the ordinance levied a tax 
on property itself or was a property tax and that since an 
ad valorem tax is already assessed each year against all real 
estate in Roanoke City by the City of Roanoke and as the 
tax ( under the ordinance) is not chargeable against all own-
ers of real estate in the City, the ordinance violates the rule 
as to uniformity and is therefore unconstitutional and 
10* void. 
*The trial court based its opinion on three cases, 
which completely support its decision. 
First: Dawson v. K entiicky Distilleries <I; Warehouse Co., 
255 U. S. 288; 65 L. Ed. 634-638. 
No discussion of that case is necessary and we merely re-
fer the Court to the case and the Court's opinion, but we do 
desire to point out one short terse statement of Judge Bran-
deis in said case, as follows: 
"To levy a tax by reason of ownership of property is to 
tax the property.'' 
As conclusive and clearly pointed out in the foregoing 
definitions of property, the right to sell and possess property 
( all kinds of property) is a right of ownership and a property 
1
right. . 
v Second: Thompson, v. McLeod, 73 So. 193 (Miss.). 
Without repeating we refer the court to that case and the 
opinion by Judge Kuyke. 
Third: IJa,nipton~ v·. Iris. Co. of North Anierica, 177 Va. 
494~14 (2) S .. E. 396. 
These three cases so fully support his decision and the 
position here taken by counsel for the defendant, that it is 
not surprising that the learned counsel for the City does not 
undertake in his petition for a writ of error to refute, or dis-
tinguish those cases from the instant case. In fact, he does 
not mention them. If he had hact any reasonable answer to 
those cases we submit, it can be readily assumed, that he 
would have pointed it out in his petition. 
11 * ·There are, however, other cases that support the de-
fendant's position on this point. 
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Pocahonta-s Consol. Collerie8 Co. v. Com., 113 Va. 108-112, 
73 S. E. 446, involved the validity of the tax of 12 cents per 
hundred imposed by the State on the recordation of deeds. 
It was contended by the plaintiff that the tax was a property 
tax. The court held at page 112, '' In {he first place this is 
· not a tax on property but a tax upon a "civil privilege", that 
is for the privilege of availing·, upon the terms prescribed by 
the statute, of the benefits •and advantages of the registry 
laws of the State". 
The court took the pains to carefully determine tbat the 
subject of the tax was not the property itself but the '' civil 
privileg·e" conferred by the registry laws. Had it not be-en 
for such privilege the court would have held that the subject 
of th~ tax was "property" and the tax invalid. 
The laws of Virginia require the clerk to record deeds 
upon the payment of the 12 cent tax (and other costs) so that 
the tax imposed by the Roanoke ordinance cannot and is not 
claimed to be valid because its subject is the benefits of the 
reg·istry laws of the State. The ordinance seeks to tax sales 
of real estate independent of recordation, and the tax is pay-
able at the time of recordation. If the deed is never re-
corded the tax never becomes due. 
, /_ The Supreme Court of Virginia in the above case cited 
V Nicol v. James .A.mes, heard with S. Killer v. Am,es, 173 U. S. 
509, 43 L. Ed. 786-794. 
12* *In those cases, heard together, Congress bad levied 
a tax on the Sale of Corporate shares of stock made at 
any exchange or board of trade and also upon sales of live-
stock made at any livestock market in. the United States, but 
did not levy a tax upon sale.s made elsewhere, or by an in-
dividual to any individual. Tbe court in its opinion held, 
'' Taxation is practical and for purposes of deciding the 
validity of a tax it should be regarded by its actual results, 
rather than by theoretical or abstract ideas, whose correct-
ness ls a subject of dispute and contradiction.'' At page 794 
the Court said, '' .A. tax upon the privilege of selling property 
at an exchange and thus using the facilities there offered in 
accomplisl1ing the sale differs radically from a tax upon 
every sale made in ·any place." "The latter tax is really 
and practically upon the property. The tax here in question 
takes no notice of any kind of privilege or facility and the 
fact of the sale is alone regarded. It is not a 'privilege' tax, 
within the. meaning of the term because there is no privilege 
other than that which every man lias to transact his own busi-
ness in his own house or in his own office under such regula-
tions as he may choose to adopt, and such a device cannot be 
in any fair use of the term, a 'privilege', which is the subject 
of taxation.'' 
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Again in the above case the court carefully pointed out 
that the subject of the tax was a privilege and if there 
13* had •been no privileg·e to be taxed it determined in no 
unmistakable· terms that it would have been a tax on 
property and invalid; 
The Roanoke City ordinance taxes every sale and purchase 
of real estate made by anyone at any place. "It takes no 
notice of any kind of privilege or facility and the fact of sale 
is alone reg·arded'' and the tax is really and practically upon 
property .. - . 
Counsel· for the City admits that the City ordinance does 
not impose a tax upon a privilege. 
In the light of ·Nicol v . .Ames (Supra), by the decision of 
the highest court of the land, which is still the law, the sub-
ject of the tax is necessarily and by process of elimination 
a "property tax" on real estate already taxed to the limit 
of the law by the ad valorern system, the only manner by 
which real property can properly be taxed in Virginia. 
May we be permitted here to point out that taxes cannot 
be levied arbitrarily. The government cannot by statute just 
demand· the citizen's money. Each valid tax must be im-
posed upon some subject defined and classified by the legis-
lature ( Constitution Section 168) and even when a subject 
is defined and classified the power to levy the tax must be 
delegated to the cities, towns and counties of the State by the 
leg·islature in fue manner provided for by the Con~titution 
before the local government can tax that particular subject. 
This will be more fully argued hereafter under Objection 
No. 4. 
Excepting capitation taxes and income taxes, the subjects 
of taxation in Virginia are only three in number, which are 
as follows: 
14• *(a) Taxes upon "property" such as real estate, 
tang·ible and intangible personal property. 
(b) Taxes on '' civil privileges'', a privilege granted by 
law, such as the 12 cent tax on recordation of deeds, inherit-
ance taxes, franchise taxes and other taxes on corporations, 
and in some instances license taxes, and sales taxes by busi-
nesses (not by individuals at any time or at any place) when 
one avails himself of the benefits of dealing, for instance, 
with a merchant. The taxes here enumerated have been 
seg-regated to the State, or the cities have never been author-
.izd to levy them. · . 
( c) License taxes, the underlying principal of which is the 
polic~ power. 
As to privilege taxes (b above) you may call them excise 
or privilege taxes. They are one and the same. If there is 
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no "civil privileg·~" it becomes a "property tax". Excise 
tuxes have been defined as ''something cut off from the main 
thing", but that definition is far from complete.. The tax 
is not upon the mere "cutting off'', for such a tax would be 
purely arbitrary without any subject to support it. There 
must be some civil privilege or benefit connected with the 
,cutting off which is really the subject of the tax. The cases 
.above cited and others bear out fully this view. 
OBJECTION NO. 3. 
The Authority to Impose 8'uch a Tax Has Never Been Dele-
ga.ted to the City of Roanoke. 
The·City of Roanoke is the agent of the State. It has only 
such powers, especially of taxation, as are delegated it 
15* *by the State, in the manner prescribed by its Consti-
tution. · 
The City charter by express terms limits its power to raise 
revenue in accordance with the Constitution aud laws of Vir-
ginia and with the Constitution of the United States. 
The charter may be likened unto an empty vessel donated 
by tbe State. It can and is only filled as the State, in its 
discretion, may from time to time see fit to do so. It has by 
the Tax Code of Virginia g·iven it the power to tax real estate 
according only to the ad valorem system, to tax tangible per-
sonal property by the same system, to tax the capital of mer-
chants but not of manufacturers, to Jevy license taxes on busi-
ness and occupations, taxes for local assessments for sewers 
.and sidewalks and capitation taxes. In brief, all the taxes 
which the City, previous to the ordinance in question was 
adopted, were expressly authorized, defined and classified by 
the State as upon taxable subjects. 
The general plan of taxation in Virginia under its Con-
stitution is that the State shall at all times have control of 
the "power of taxation" by its agents, cities, towns and coun-
ties. Only by such control can the prime purpose of the 
Constitution as to uniformity of the taannlJ power through-
out the boundaries of the State be maintained. 
The subjects of taxation above mentioned are given to the 
City by the Tax Code of Virginia. No power to tax sales of 
real estate are g·iven the City by the Tax Code. Admittedly 
there may be, and we believe there are, other subjects tax-
able by the St.ate, but until they are given to the cities of 
the State by the lgislature the cities have no power of taxa-
tion over them. 
16* * By Section 8 of the Tax Code of Virginia al,l subjects 
of taxation, except those especially enumerated herein, 
are segregated and made subject to State taaation <mly. 
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Counsel for the City in his petition see~ fit to ignore the 
above clear requirement of the law of Virginia. 
The State legislature has complete power over cities at all 
times; it creates them, and may add or take away, alter or 
amend the power of cities and completely amend their char-
ters if it desires. 
The power to levy and collect sales taxes, not being· <mum-
erated in the Tax Code, are subject to State taxation only, 
until and if the State sees fit to allow the cities to tax them. 
Counsel for the City in his petition points out that the 
State imposes taxes on sales of gasoline. Very true, but a 
reading of the cases cited by him will reveal that they are 
license taxes or that the Court has held them to be privilege 
taxes, upon the benefit of using· the highway or airports con-
structed by the State. They are to this good day taxes upon 
subject of "State taxation only". · 
Section 168 of the Constitution of Virginia provides, the 
,leg-islature "may define and classify subjects of taxation". 
It has never defined and classified sales of real estate as 
subject of taxation, and we submit tllat the Counsel for the 
City of Roanoke should not be pennitted to itsurp the po'Wer 
to defi'ne and classify taxable sitbjccts gra-ntecl by the people 
in their Constitution solely to. the legislature. To hold 
17• *otherwise is to hold that the City is a separate inde-
pendent autonomous State, independent of the Common-. 
wealth of Virginia and its Constitution, with power to do and 
tax as it sees fit without 'regard to the Constitution or laws 
of the State, and not, as is the fact, a mere govern:qiental agent 
of the State . 
.,.Section 63 of the Constitution provides under Item ( 5) 
that local and special laws shall -not be· enacted for the as-
sessnient and collection of' taxes, except for the protection of 
the farmers of the State. The City Charter is a local law 
and not a g·eneral one. Any power to tax which the city has,. 
must, by virtue of said Section, be given by general law. Only 
by such a law can the State maintain and carry out the pur-
pose and policy of the Constitution as to uniformity of taxa-
tion. This does not mean that the rate of taxation must be 
the same in all the cities of the State but the po'Wer to levy 
any particular tax must be uniform throughout the State. 
One city may require a higher rate than another and one 
city may require taxation of all permissible subjects and an-
otl1er may not, to meet their respective requirements, but the 
po'Wer as distinguished from the rate must be uniform. 
This case is not to be confused with license tax cases. Li-
. cense taxes have been defined by the Legislature and cities 
and counties have by general law-the Tax Code of Virginia 
-been given the power to levy them. 
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Noi-folk v. Grriffin, 120 Va. 524-535, held that when the leg .. 
islat.m·e embodied in the charter of the City of Norfolk 
1s• the *limitation "in accvrdance with the Constitittion and 
laws ef tJiis State and tke United .States ( same in Roa-
noke charter), the charter in effect itself provided that the 
,,nu/wic-ipal-ity shmtld not ,in, acfoig thereitnder enact any ordi-
·na.ncc of cla~sification, for vurvoses of foxatio,i in conflwt 
.with a cla ... ~sificat-imi adopted by the laws of the St-ate; for the 
inevitable result of such a conflict in enactment between the 
State and the municipality would be a violation of the ·uni-
formity in operation of laws soug·ht to be attained by the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of t]Je United States, which purpose, indeed, of attain- · 
ment of uniformity so far as practicable, also underlies the 
provisions of our State Constitution and laws on the subject 
'Of taxation. * ~ * It is plain, that the le,qislat-ure meant ta 
·make sta.te boundary lines the lirnits of the scope of inqiiiry 
,as to the uniforrnity of the operation of such ordinances upon 
the subject of taxation. A conflict .of the ordinance of Nor-
folk with a state statute mav not be a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution., but it would 
be a violation of its spirit, and a direct violation of th~ said 
lirnUation of the charter of the City itself.'' The above case 
was quoted in Arnerican Tob. Co. v. Dainville, 125 Va. 12-24-25. 
In LeebU'r,q _v. Loudoun County, 181 Va. 279-284, the Court 
held, "In Virginia local, special and private legislation may 
be enacted provided the procedure of the enactment is in 
accordance with Section 51 of the Constitution ood is not 
prohibited by Sections 63-64 or some other section thereof." 
~'The State has not enacted any general law enabling 
19* the City to impose the tax mentioned in its ordinance, 
and the ordinance therefore is in conflict with Sections 
63-64 and part of Section 168 of the Constitution quoted above 
as to defining and classifying subjects of taxation. 
The whole question. of delegation of power by the state to 
,cities is put to rest in Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 
560. wherein the court held in an opinion by Justice Gregory, 
as follows: , 
"The title to the Tax Code, to revise, simplify, arrange and 
,consolidate into one act the general tax and revenue statutes 
of the Commonwealth, which act shall constitute and be de-
si~ned as the 'Tax Code of Virg·inia ', clearly indicates that 
,all statutes relating to listing, assessing and taxin,q all sub-
jects of taa;ation are to be found in that Gode." 
·As pointed out previously, no mention is made of taxes on· 
sales of reai estate in the Tax Code or elsewhere. The power 
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to determine the persons, objects to be taxed, is entrusted ex-
clusively to the legislative department of the State. 
Fulkerson/ v. Bristol, 105 Va. 555. 
"The power of taxation was then and is now a govern-
mental power subject to modification or repeal at the pleasure 
of the le~islature and 1iot 'Utider the control of the city." 
Danville T. d; P. Co. v. Danville, 168 Va. 430-435. 
Southeni Ry. Co. v. City of Richmond, 175 Va. 308, 8 S. E .. 
(2d) 271. 
20* *In the latter case the court held, "There is no in-
herent power Jn municipalities to levy taxes, they can 
tax only as the State in its wisdom has thought proper to per-
mit.'' . 
In Town of Wytheville v. Johnson's Exor., 108 Va. 589, 62 
S. E. 382, the question before the court was whether or not the 
Town had the power to levy an inheritance tax. The court, 
in an opinion by Judge Whittle, held that although the Town 
Charter provided that the Town could tax anything taxed by 
the State,. that it could not tax inheritances, saying that when 
the City assumes to exercise the power of taxation over any 
subj'ect, it 1n1ust be able to show a warrant for it in, the ve.ry 
words of the grant, the power to tax, being strictly construed. 
At page 593 the court said, '' It would seem clear from the 
authorities that the power of a rnunicipality to attach such a. 
burden to the devolution. ·of property can only be co1iferred 
by express grant''. 
If the towns and cities of the State cannot levy inheritance 
taxes, which are classified as taxable subjects by the legisla-
ture and authorized by the Constitution, how then can a city 
tax sale of real estate, which is not even mentioned in either? 
Counsel for the City has not in his petition sho~n the way. 
The City in its petition cites Norfolk v. Norfolk Lanclmark, 
95 Va. 564. This was a license tax case and did not involve 
a question as to taxation .of sales. License taxes were ex-
pressly authorized by the Constitution but the main distinc-
tion between that case and the instant case is that the Norfolk 
Landmark case was decided under the provisions of the 
. 21 * •code of 1887 before our present Code of 1902. The 
old Code did not contain sections 168 and 63 above quoted 
and referred to. At the time of the above decision there was 
no requirement as to the uniformity or of general laws to 
levy taxes. The case of Fredericksburg v. Sanitary Grocery 
·Co., 168 Va. 57, cited on page 8 of the City's petition is like-
wise a license tax case and cities are authorized by the Tax 
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Code to levy such taxes by express grant in the Tax Code-a 
general Jaw. 
\i\7ithout dealing· with each case cited by the petitioner, may 
we point out that all cases cited deal with license taxes and 
have to do with a business, or some other tax expressly 
enumerated in the Constitution and Tax Code of Virginia 
.and are not in any way applicable to the case presented by 
the ordinance in question. · 
In this connection may we call the court's attention to 
Section 117 of the Constitution of 1902, which provided that 
cities may retain their charters "provided that every such 
charter is hereby amended so as to conform to· all the pro-
visions, restrictions, limitations and powers set forth in this 
article or otherwise provided in this Constitution". 
Hicks v. Bristol, 102 Va. 861 (decided June, 1904), 47 S. E. 
100, construes the above constitution provisions and strikes 
from the charter certain powers expressly contained therein 
to levy special assessments for street improvements. 
Again by the same token the Charter of the City of Roa-
noke cannot confer upon the City any power in conflict with 
Sections 63-64-168, or any other sections of' the Constitu-
tion .. 
22* *T n Dcitncam. Campbell, et als., v. Bryant Mayor, 104 
Va. 509, 513; 52 S. E. 638, at page 513, the Court said, 
'' The provision of our present fundamental law prohibiting 
(special) legislation and providing that general laws for the 
organization and government of cities and towns shall be ex-
acted and that no special act shall be. passed in relation there-
to, is second to no provisions of the Constitu.tion in vah,e and 
iniporta11,ce a11ul cannot be too carefiilly observed or strictly 
construed.'' 
In the above case there was no general law on the tax ques-
tion involved and the. tax was held invalid, the Court saying 
at the bottom of page 514, '' Section 117 is self-executing so 
far as it prohibits special' legislation and also to the extent 
that it amends charters of towns and cities so as to make 
them conform to the Constitution". Hicks v. Bristol, supra, . 
was cited in this case. ' 
Standard Oil Conipa.n.y v. Fredericksburg, 105 Va. 82, and 
Arey v. Lindsey, 103 Va. 250, 48 S. E. 889, expressly held 
that the intent, purpose and effect of the Constitution was 
to. abrog·ate such features of charters as were in conflict with 
the Constitution atnd to forbide special acts in the future. 
The Charter of Roanoke, as we have observed, is a local 
law and it will be construed as vesting in the City only such 
pqwers as are delegated to it in the manner provided by the 
Constitutfon by express grant and general law. 
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The learned counsel for the City in his petition refers sev-
eral times (pages 11, 12, 15) to Ii1,..ntor1t v. Co1nmon-
23• wealth, 166 *Va. 229, 183 S. E. 873. · 
The facts of that case and the decision of the court 
does not have even the most remote bearing· upon the facts 
and the law pertaining to the instant case. In HU'nton v. Co11i-
rni.onwealth the question for decision was whether or not the 
State, not a city, could impose an inco1ne tax on dividends de-
rived from corporate stock. 
The Constitution of Virginia, Section 170, provides that 
the General . Assembly may levy a tax on incomes in excess 
of $600.00. This provision was contained in the Code of 1869 
and carried forward in to the Code of 1902. As to that pro-
vision the court at page 239 said, "we think an examination 
of the Virginia Constitution, in the light of its historical back-
ground, shows that the builders intended that income derived 
from property and property itself be treated as separate and 
distinct subjects of taxation". On page 243 (9) the Court 
said, ''When a dividend is paid it becomes separated from the 
stock and becomes a subject of taxation, different from the 
property from which it is derived, just as growing· timber, 
when cut, loses its nature as real estate and becomes personal 
property". The Court on page 244 gives certain examples 
of taxable subjects, inheritance license and automobile taxes, 
in all of wl1ich the subject taxed is a civil privilege. 
The tax there considered (income tax) was a State Tax. 
The Court did not consider or decide that a city could levy 
an income tax, and in fact did not consider any constitutional 
provision other than at Section 170 and 177, or any provision 
of the Tax Code except Sections 216 and -229. 
• A tax on a sale of real estate, wllich is a tax on au 
24* element or attribute of real estate, in no way resembles 
a tax on dividends from stock. Iu the case of sa]es of 
real estate there is no separation of one attribute from the 
property,, similar to the cutting of growing trees. 
While the decision in the above cai-:e is at variaure with the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States i.n Pollock 
v. Farmers' Loan_d!; Trust GonipanJJ, 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 
759, 15~ U. S. 601, 39 L. Ed. 1108, which held the Federal 
income tax law invalid and culmined in the XVI amendment 
the court was of the opinion that, in the light of the historical 
background of the provisions for income tax in the Virginia 
Constitution of Virginia as far -baek as 1869, or before, tl1e 
builders of the Constitution of Vir~inia intended incomes 
from property and property itself to be re2;arded and treated 
as separate and distinct subjects of taxation. 
May we again respectfully submit that the above rase in 
no way supports the validity of the Roanoke City ordinance. 
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· The case of Bemis. v~ Graham Coun(1l, 198 S. E. 843, cited 
by Counsel for the City is not at all in point. The statute 
of• North Carolina provided that "All property, real or per-
.sonal shall be listed or listed and assessed, as the case may 
be, in accordance with ownership as of the first day of 
25* April, 1937.," *and annually thereafter. The . United 
States began proc~edings to condemn Bemis' property 
in February, 1937, and the final -decree adjudging the title to 
be divested from Bemis and vested in the United States was 
entered in August of 1'937. The court held that Bemis was 
the owner of the property on April 1, 1})37, and the ref ore 
.liable for the taxes,. that the tax was not an excise tax for 
the privilege of owning- property. 
The case of Bnc!cstaff v. llfcK-inle.zJ, 127 S. vV. (2) 802, cited 
by Counsel for the City is not in point. This case involved 
the refusal of the plaintiff to pai a tax as employer under 
the Arkansas Unemployment Compensation law. In holding 
this tax valid tl1e court quotes the preamble thereof, in fact, 
.as follows: '' '~· .. * the public good, and the g·eneral welfare 
of the citizens of this State r~quire tl1c enactment of the Un-
employment Compensation law, under the police power of 
the State * * •.'' The ordinance of the City of Roanoke in 
question is no exercise of the police power. . 
Emphasis should be laid on the fact, ancl as i;;tatecl in Judge 
Kuyk's opinion, in the lower court., that counsel for the City 
admits tlmt tl1e tax under tl1e ordinanre is not a privilege tax, 
stating· in his brief that "it is not claimed bv the City that 
the tax in question is a privileg·e tax." "The tax is on a 
transaction; to-wit: the sale of real estate, and not on the 
right to purchase or own property,'' consequently, it 
26*. seems proper to •assume that t]1e tax payer would ob-
tain no benefit or privilege whatever by payment of the 
tax required by this ordinance. 
The ordinance in ouestion calls itself a sales tax, the ad-
]1esive stamps provided for by this ordinance have on the 
face tl1ereof the words, ''Real Estate Sales Tax.'' 
Counsel for Donckers have studied the sales tax statutes 
of our sister states of West Virginia and North Carolina. In 
-each instance tl1e preamble to the act provides that it is levied 
for the priviler--e of euga~ring- or continuirnr to enp:age in the · 
l)usiness of selling at retail or wholesale of tangible personal 
property. . 
The ·ordinance in ouestion is Hn attempt to impose a sales 
tax and the City of Roanoke has no authoritv to do so. As 
tl1c Court knows there is current agitation for the General 
Assembly at its forthcoming session to enact a sales tax. If 
the St.ate possesses such a power, Section 168 and Section 63 
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of the Constitution provides that it shall be levied and· col-
lected under general law and that the General Assembly must 
define and classify the subjects of the tax.. If the state has. 
not enacted a sales tax, how can the City of Roanoke jump 
the General Assembly, the source of all ta."Xiug power, and 
assume its prerogative to do sot 
Taxation is primarily a legislative funrtion, ancl all taxa-
tion is based upon legislative authority. The only warrant 
for the imposition of a tax or burden upon the citizen or bis 
property without his consent must be found in some poRitive 
law, a~d it cannot be enforced unless imposed in the manner 
authorized by statute. ( Queens Count11 ,TYa.ter Co. v. 
27* · Monroe, 83 App. Div. 105., *82 N. Y. Supp. 610; Cooley's 
Municipal Corporations, Sec. 137; City of Riclnnond v. 
Drewry-Hu,qhes Co., 122 Va. 178, 94 S. E. 989. · 
The taxing power of a municipality is one of original grant 
of power to tax to which the rule· str·ictissi-mi juris applies ... 
We look then to see what section p]ainly conferred the power 
in question. (Vfrginia. H'lwlr~Rale Co. v . .Appalachia; 131 Va. 
357, 108 S. E. 660.) We look in vain for any section of the 
Virginia Code conferring the pow~r attempted here to be 
exercised by the City of Roanoke. 
The petitioner states that the tax is upon the transactions, 
which we submit is a meaningleRs statement when one in-
quires, what is the transaction 1 The transaction clearly is a 
sale of real estate on the part of one and a purchase on the 
part of the other party by which he acquires property. As 
we have demonstrated the right to sell is a property right or 
attribute of ownership of property and the right to acquire 
and J?Ossess property is an inherent natural right of every 
individual g·uaranteed by the Bill of Rights (See Objection 
No. 4). 
The tax in no way resembles the stamp tax imposed by the 
Federal Government, which requires stamps to be affixed to 
deeds. That tax is usually and aptly cal1ed a Document on 
use tax. The subject taxed is not tl1e sale but the nse of the 
written instrument or deed, and is a privilege tax upon the 
civil benefits gained by the parties l1y use of the instrument 
instead of the cumbersome old methods of transferrin,g: title 
by livery of seizen possession, etc. At one tin~e the 
2s• United States required *notes and bonds to be stamped. 
· The subject there taxed was tl1e use of tl1e written instru-
ments and the benefits or privile~es accruing under the laws 
pertaining to negotiable instruments. · 
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OBJECTION NO. 4. 
The ·ordinance TTiolates the. Constitution of the United States 
and of Virginia and the. Law~ of Vfrginia Becau~e the 
Subject Sought to be Taxed Thereby is Not a Proper 
Subject of 1'axation. . . 
On this point Counsel for the City states that the defend-
ant claims the ordinance conflicts with the Bill of Rights (Ar-
ticle 1, Section 1, Virginia Constitution) in. which statement 
he is correct but he in answer to said contention merely in-
dulges in remote inapplicable general statements. He cites 
no case and no authority in support of the city's position that 
the City or even the State has no right to tax inherent, basic, 
natural rights guaranteed to every .citizen by the Bill of 
Rights. 
The Bili of Rights. is as follows: 
"Sec. 1. Equality and rights of men.-That all men are 
by nature free and independent and have certain inherent 
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of soeiety, they 
cannot, by any compact deprive or divest their posterity,, 
namely, the enjoyment of l-ife and liberty, with the means of 
acquiring and p0Bsc.c;.~i'l1.(J properf:1.1 and pursuing and obtain-
ing happiness a nil safety.'' 
The subject of the tax imposed by the Roanoke City ordi-
- nance is the natural inherent basic rig·ht of every per-
29• son to a.cquire *property guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights and not a civil privilege or benefit bestowed upon 
the citizen by the laws of the State. This· is either expressly 
admitted or not denied by Counsel for the petitioner. 
All sales taxes in existence today in Virgfoia, or elsewhere. 
are taxes upon a. privilege as distinguished from a natural 
right. They are upon the privilege of conducting and continu-
ing to conduct some kind of business-usually the sale of con-
sumer goods. The underlying principle which supports them 
is that expressed in N-icol v . .A.'11u~s, 8'ltpra, vix .. that the sub-
ject of the tax is the benefits a~cruin~ from the use of the 
facilities afforded bv the marketA. All valid sales taxes are 
12rivilege taxes. If .. there is no privilege in connection with 
the sale the tax is either a direct tax on property or is upon 
a natural inherent right, which in law is not a mere civil 
privilege. · 
The question here presented has not arisen freqnenHy in 
the courts for the simple reason that it appears that the 
principle we contend for was well recognized ever since the 
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beginning of democracy. Those basic rights guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights are like unto the immunities of freedom of 
religion, of speech and of the press. Can anyone imagine 
for a moment a tax upon one's right to worship as he sees 
fitY 
However, there are several instances in which revenue 
hungry governments have undertaken to tax the inherent 
right of the citizen to acquire property. 
Thompson v. M cLcod (Miss.), 73 So. 193, L. R. A. 1918 C. 
893, Am. Case. 1918 A. 67 4, held that an owner of a 
30* pine tree enjoys •the same natural right to extract gum 
from his own tree as the .owner of a grapevine has to 
pluck his own grapes. It would be the same thing to require 
a tax as a precedent right of the owuer to pick ripe pecans 
from his pecan orchard or to enjoy a drink of pure water from 
the cool spring on the old homestead.'' 
In Thompson. v. l(reat:'!er, 72 So. 891 (:Miss.), 1916, a tax 
had been levied upon each person purs-µing the business of 
buying, owning or holding more than 1.,000 acres of timber 
land. The tax was held invalid. 
Both of the above cases were cited in Dawson v. Kentucky 
Distillerie.';, 255 U. S. 288, 65 L. Ed. 638, cited above and in 
Judge Kuyk's opinion. 
The natural rights, among which is tbe right to acquire 
property, have been . reserved by the people. The c~se of 
Beebe v. State (Ind.), 63 Am. Dee. 391-400, traces the history 
of and defines those rig·hts clearly, saying, "We proceed then 
to inquire what these reserved rights are (reserved bv the 
people) and to ascertain we go, as we have said, to the .. com-
mon law." Chanceller Kent, following Blackstone, says: 
"The absolute right of individuals may be resolved into the 
right of personal secnrif.v, the right of per.';onal Uberty and 
the 1right to acquire and en.iov property." 2 Keut Com. 1, 
not sonie propertv or one kind" of property, bu.t at least what 
society or organized 901.:ernm.ent recoyni,oes as property. In 
Arrowsmu,ch v. B1trlin,qton, 4 McLean 497, it is said," .A free-
man 1rwJ1 bu.y and sell a.t his pleasure. This r-igh.t is not of 
society but from 'natu:re. He never ,gave it up. It would be 
amusing to see a. man hunting through law *'books for 
31 * authority to buy or sell or make a bargain.'' To the 
same effect Lord Coke in .2 Int. C 29~ µ. 47. Rutherford 
Institutes 20. '' The word liberty as used in the Constitution 
of the United States of the States means more than freedom 
from restraint. It means the right to live and work where 
be will to enter in all contracts which he may deem proper, 
necessary and essential to the successful conduct of his pri-
vate aff afrs." 
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Y oitng v. Com., 101 Va. 85:3, 4~ S. E. 327. 
"A sale i$ the consummation of a contract on the part of 
one to sell and of the other to buy. Under the Bill of Rig-hts 
e-v~ry person has that inherent right and the government un-
der the Constitution cannot impair in any way such contracts, 
or any other right of ownership of property.'' 
See also State v. Julow, 31 S. 1''. 782, 29 L. R. A. 257 · 50 
Am. St. Rep. 443. ' 
'' The right of property preserved by the Constitution is 
the right not only to possess and enjoy property hut to ac-
quire it by any lawful mode." 
Low v. Rees Printin.,q Co., 59 N. ·w. 362-366. 
St. F·ur. Co. v • . A nnour, 177 N. E. 702-705. 
The onlv instance in the whole United States we have been 
:able to find after careful search, where a City has undertaken 
to tax the sale of real estate, is found in the Florida case of 
the City of Pensacola v. Lawrence, 170 So. 793-795, in which 
the taxing ordinance was held invalid. Counsel for the City, 
it may be safely assumed has also made careful exami-
32* nation of ,x,the authorities, but he has· not cited any case 
holding: such a taxing ordinance valid. In the Pensa-
cola case the City passed nn ordinance taxing all sales of real 
estate in the City, and by the terms of the ordinance termed 
the tax an excise tax. The Citv contended it was an ~xcise tax 
and as such it had the rigllt to ·1evy it under the general power 
of taxation. The same contention is here made bv· the Citv 
of Roanoke. · · 
·The Court held otlierwise, snying, "an excise or privilege 
tax· has reference to tl1ose engaged in a continuing series of · 
transactions and could have no reference to remote, isolated 
or infrequent sales of real estate,'' and tl1at therefore the 
ordinance sought to levy not an exciRe but a property tax on 
property already taxed. 
The ordinance was held invalid for the further reason that 
it placed a tax upon a subject not taxable. On this latter 
point the court said if the city could put a tax on remote in-
frequent sales of real estate, it could also tax "the sale of 
every cat, dog·, chicken., mass of greens or other commodity 
from ones back vard.'' 
The court saici furtl1er that the ordinance "imposes a tax 
011 a class of transactions not heretofore considered as proper 
A 
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to be embraced in such statutes. If·such power was intended 
it should be given in clear and certain terms.'' 
By the same token, it may be said of the instant case, that 
if the Legislature of Virginia bad intended to confer upon 
the City of Roanoke the power claimed by it it would 
3H• and must *have done so in clear ancl certain terms by 
express grant in the manner prescribed by the Constitu-
tion, which vests all legislative power in the legislature and. 
which requires by Section 168 tlrnt all taxation be by general 
law, defining· the subjectR of taxation. Section 63 must be 
read with Sections 168, 117 and 63 must be construed together. 
Portsmouth v. lf! eis~, 145 Va. 94. 
· The leading case on the question considered under this ob-
jection is Taylor v. Sn1.ith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S. E. 239 ( opinion 
by Judge .Burks), which held, ''Thero are certain inherent 
rights which men do not surrender by entering into organized 
society, and of which they cannot be arbitrarily d~privecl by 
the State. They are briefly summarized in general terms in 
Section 1 of the Constitution of the State (and here he quoted 
said Section 1). !rhey embrace all businesses that are legiti-
mate in character· and are of such nature as to indicate that 
they are inherent in the individual claiming them.'' 
And continuing J uclge Burks quotes-in C1ttrona v. TVil-
lianison, 124 A.tl. 658-663-4--'' The right of dominion over ones 
own property, .to use it as he sees fit so long· as the rights of 
others are not infringed upon, is a right whicb not even the 
State can take away. TI-Tith rP-,qpect to s11ch rl,qltts the. extent 
of the State's vower is that o.f re_qulation." · 
The individual's right to live and own property are nnturaJ 
rights ( as distinguished from privileges) for the enjoyment of 
which an excise tax cannot be imposed. 
34 • •26 R. C. L., p. 209, p. 236. 
Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.), Sec. 1676. 
In re opinion of Justices, 195 MasR. 607 84 N. E. 499. 
In the September, 1947, issue of the American Bar As~ocia-
tion Journal, pages 887 and 966, is an article by Ha rokl R. 
McKinnon of the California Bar on '' Individual Rights''. He, 
no doubt, ever heard of the Virginia case of Taylor v. 8m-ith. 
supra, or Sudg·e Burks, but :he comes to the same eonclusion 
with reference to· natural iri.diYidual rights ns did ,J ndge 
Burks. Mr. McKinnon holds, page 966, that there is some-
thing absolute about natural rights and also something rela--
tive, in that they may be regulated for tlle common good. 
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Under both, the view of McKinnon · and of the Virginia 
Court, the only power of the State over natural rights as de-
fined in the Bill of Rights is that of reg·ulation, which allows 
the government under the exercise of the police power to 
enact building codes, zoning laws and set back requirements. 
The Roanoke City ordinance is not a regulatory one, but 
purely a revenue measure. The "common good" is not af-
fected because "a" instead of "b '' happens to own any par-
ticular parcel of land. . 
The impairment restrained, or deuiftl of natural rights is 
totalitariarism, not constitutional democracy. 
The ideas he're presented are not original, they a.re not 
new, but. tbey have been long and fully recognized.. Washing 
ton and his Colonial Army fought for them. The build-
35* ers of our *Constitutions long advocated and reduced 
them to writing and adopted them and for the most part 
they have been fully respected and adhered to ever since. Let 
us be reminded of the words of John Adams. ''You have 
rights antecedent to all earthly government; rights that can-
not be repealed or restrained by hurnan lml'S; rights derived 
from the Great Legislator of the Universe.'' 
· Govei:nment among men was instituted to protect not to 
encroach upon and whittle away those rights men. possessed 
prior to organized government. · 
There is ·a tendency among men recently elected to public 
office., after an intense struggle at the polls, to feel their oats, 
to feel that they are the law and the masters, and to fail to 
recognize that the people are the masters and they ate the 
servants of the people, subject to the restrain and restric-
tions surrounding them, imposed by the laws and Constitu-
tion of the state. 
At the present time in the world tlrnre is a battle waging 
between those who would preserve natural rights, the basis 
of constitution government or "Democracy", a11d another fac-
tion which sows, either intentionally or unintentionally: the 
seed of communism. We, in this Repuhlie, still have the Bill 
of Rights, while those who live beyond the ''Iron .Curtain" 
are in a land of slavery, not of liberty. Those people have 
no rig·hts which tbe government is bound to respeet. The 
government is an all-powerful maRter, the people its slaves. 
'*Virginia, if not the birthplacCl, was the cFadle of 
36* . *Democracy and freedom. Its court more so than those 
of some other states have coura~cously and steadfastly 
adhered to the principals and teaclJing of our fotmding 
fathers. But today the pressure from within and from with-
out is directed towards destroying·, breaking down and chisel-
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ing· away our cherished rig·hts, to a degree not dreamed of a 
few years ago. Those who cry,, we must have more money 
for this and that, either expect the other fellow to furnish it, 
or they know not that they are bartering away their liberty 
and natural rights for a mere mess of porridg·e. 
vV e, of Virginia, are, and have a right to he: proud of our 
State's record in the cause of lihertv and freedom for t.he 
individual. It-is our confident l1ope, our ferveut prayer, that 
Virg·inia will ever maintain its record and going forward will, 
in these ·unsettled times, continue to strike wheneYer oppor-
tunity affords, new blows in the cause, again taking the lead 
and pointing· the way for the preservation of orderly, planned, 
constitutional democracy, of which the first requisite is the 
preservation of the peoples' natural inherent rights, so well 
defined in the opinion of Jndge Burks. 
OBJECTION NO. 5. 
The Ordinance TV as .Adopted as wn Emergency Ordina1ice 
Con.trarv to the Pro·Pi.i;ions of Section 13 of the 
Charter of the City (If Roanoke. 
Section 13 of the Roanoke City Charter defines an emer-
gency measure as follows : 
37* ' ., 'An emergency measure is an ordinance or i·esolu-
tion for the immediate presei·vation of the public pea,ce, 
property, health or safetJt or for the us'ltal daily opera.tion of 
a municipal departm.ent.'' 
The ordinance in question is purely a revenue measure for 
general purposes of the City government as a whole. It doc':; 
not provide for those matters embraced in the ''police power'' 
of the City. The right to acquire a home is no occasion foi' 
the exercise of that power. 
The words "usual daily operation of a municipal depart-
ment", in the ordinary and usual sense which they were used 
were never intended to give the City power to assess and col-
lect taxes by emergency measures. Everything tliat was said 
and meant by those words was tlrnt the Cit~r mfo.·ht, by an 
emerg·ency .ordinance by way of illustration only, increase or 
decrease the number of policemen or .firemen in those depart-
ments, decrease or increase the pay of employees, contract for 
necessary supplies or equipment needed by the City, from 
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-Ume to time, prescribe the dutieR of the various departments 
.and other similar and usual rout:ine duties and functions of 
the Po lie~, Fire, Engineers and City Manager's Departments. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully -submitted tl1at the trial rourt did not 
rerr in finding the defendant not guilty., and in dismissing the 
warrant against him. 
i<PRAYER. 
Your deftmdunt prays that the petition of the City of Roa .. 
11oke for a "\Vrit of Error to the judgment complained of be 
dismissed and that a ·writ of Error b~ denied.. 
RULE 9., SUB SEG. 6. 
Counsel for the ·defer1dant states that a copy of these ob-
Jections was on the 19th day of December, 1947, mailed to 
the opposing counsel in the trial court, and that these ob-
j-ectio11s were filed with Justice Herbert B. Gregory .at Roa .. 
noke, Virginia, on the 19th day of December., 1947. 
OPPOSING BRIEF IN LIEU OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF. 
Coul1'sel for the defendant desire, in the event a Writ of 
Error is awarded, that these objections be adopted as their 
brief for the hearing .. 
HAROLD JOSEPH DONCKERS, 
By H. M. MOOMAW, 
W. COlJRTNEY KING, 
Counsel. 
1001-2 Colonial-American Nat. Bank Bldg-. 
Roanoke, Virginia. ~ · 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Dirk .A. Kuyk, Judge of the 
Hustings Court of the City of Roanoke, Virginia, on the 
third day of October, One Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-
seven, .A. D. 1947. 
City of Roanoke 
'V, . 
Harold ·Joseph Donckers .. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: on the 20th day 
of May, 1947, the Civil and Police Justice for said City of 
Roanoke, on the complaint and information on oath of "\V. D. 
Equi, Jr., Delinquent Tax Collector for the City of Roanoke, · 
Va., a criminal warrant was issued for the arrest of Harold 
Joseph Donckers, upon which warrant the defendant was ar-
raigned, tried and convicted, from which conviction the de-
fendant appealed to the ·Hustings Court of the said City of 
Roanoke, Virg·inia. 
Which criminal warrant is in the words and figures follow-
ing, to-wit: 
page 2 t CRIMIN.AL WARRANT. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Roanoke, To-wit: 
To all or any of the Police Officers of said City: 
WHEREAS W. D. Equi, Jr., Delinquent Tax Collector, 
City of Roanoke, Va., has this day made complaint and in-
formation on oath, before me, the undersigned Civil and Po-
lice Justice of said City, that' Harold Josep11 Donckers on 
or about the 2nd day of May, 1947, at said City, did acquire 
by purchase real estate in the City of Roanoke, known as Lot 
4, Block 2, Section 1, Rosalind Hills, and thereafter did un-
lawfully fail to pay, on or before May 13, 1947, the date. the 
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deed conveying said real estate to him was offered for record 
in the Clerk's Office, the tax required on the sale, to amt., 
$113.00, and did fail to purchase and affix to said deed the 
stamps evidencing- the payment of the aforesaid tax, in vio-
lation of Ordinance No. 9035 of the City of Roanoke impos-
ing said tax. 
These are, therefore, in the name of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, to command you forthwith to t,1pprehend and 
bring before m,e, the said Civil and Police Justice of said 
City, the body of the said Harold Joseph Donckers to answer 
said complaint and be further dealt with according to law. 
And, moreover, upon the arrest of the said .......... by 
virtue of this Warrant, I command you in the name 
page 3} of the Commonwealth of Virginia to summon ..... . 
to appear at the Police Court, as witness, to tes-
tify in behalf of the Commonwealth of Virg·inia, against the 
said ............ and have then and there this Warrant, with 
vour return thereon . 
.., Given under my hand and seal this 20th day .of May, 1947. 
R. F. PENCE, 
Civil and P. J. (Seal) 
The within named Harold Joseph Donckers (White) was 
broug·ht before me this 20th day of May, 1947, and on the 
evide-nce of W. D. Equi, Jr., be is found guilty of failing to 
pav the tax required on the sale of real estate and did fail 
to "'purchase and affix to said deed the stamps evidencing the 
payment of the aforesaid tax, in violation of Ordinance No. 
9035 of the City of Roanoke imposing said tax, as charged 
in the within warrant and I do adjudg·e that he be confined 
in the jail of the City of Roanoke for ........ days and pay 
a fine of $10.00 and $. . . . . . cost. 
I have sent ....... on for fur.ther action to the Grand Jury 
of the Hustings Court of the City of Roanoke and have 
reco~:nized the above-named witnesses in the sum of $ ..... . 
each.to appear at 10 o'clock A. lVI., at _the Courthouse of said 
City on the first day of the next Grand Jury term. 
R. F. PENCE, 
C. & P. J. 
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page 4 r .AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The parties, by their attorneys, agree that if witnesses 
were called to testify in this case, the established facts would 
be, to-wit: 
(1) Ordinance No. 9035 of the City of Roanoke was passed 
by the council of said city, as an emergency ordinance, on 
the 28th day of April, 1947, all five members of council vot-
ing therefoi:. The charter requirements, relating to publica-
tion and enrollment of ordinances, were complied with. The 
ordinance has not l)een amended or repealed. 
Ordinance No. 9035, including its title,. is as follows: 
An ordinance to amend and re-ordain an ordinance en-
titled '' An Ordinance levying a tax on the sale of real estate,. 
or any interest therein, :fixing the amount of the tax,· pro-
viding for the colle~tion thereof, and prescribing penalties 
for its violation", No. 8948, passed on lt,ebruary 17, 1947, so 
as to include therein exchanges of real estate and to exclude 
therefrom lien indebtedness on real estate in the determina-
tion of the amount of tax imposed thereby. 
Whereas, for the usual daily operatfon of the municipal 
government, and in order to provide forthwith additional 
revenue for the city's needs, an emerg·ency exists: 
Therefore, be it ordained by the Council of the City of 
Roanoke that Ordinance No. 8948, passed on the 17th day of 
February, 1947, entitled "An ordinance levying a 
page 5 ~ tax on the sale of real estate, or any interest therein, 
fixing the amount of the tax, providing for the 
collection thereof, and prescribing penalties for its violation'' 
be amended and re-ordained to read as follows: 
Section 1. There is hereby levied a tax upon each sale or 
exchange of real est.ate situated in the City of Roanolfe, or 
any mterest therein, except as is provided in section three 
hereof. The tax shall be at the rate of one dollar on every 
one hundred dollars or fraction thereof of the consideration 
of the deed or the actual value of the property sold or ex-
changed, free from any lien indebtedness thereon, whichever 
is'the g-reater. In case of doubt, the value determined as the 
/
/basis for the State recordation tax shall be, prima facie, the 
value of the property sold or exchanged for the purpose of 
this ordinance. 
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Section 2. The tax shall be paid by the yendee or transferee 
by the · :) from the ci · r, of adhesive stamps 
of such deaign and enominations as may be prescribed by 
the Council of the City of Roanoke, and sbaJJ be due and 
a rable at the t · onve in';; · -
fer o · ' offi th 
ma·s Court of the Qjt~,; of _Roapglrn. Su?h sta~ps, in t e re-
qms1te amount of the tax imposed by this ordmance, shall be 
affixed to the deed conveying such property to the grantee 
and cancelled by stamping or writing on the faces thereof 
the date of such cancellation with ink or an indelible writing 
material. 
Section 3. The tax imposed by section one of this ordi-
nance shall not apply to any sale or transfer of 
page 6 } real estate, or interest therein, to the State or to 
any political subdivision thereof, or to any grantee 
in whom ownership of such real estate would entitle such 
grantee to an exemption from real estate taxes on the prop-
erty so sold or transferred. Nor shall the tax .apply to any 
sale or exchange involving property of less than one hundred 
dollars of actual value, free from lien indebtedness thereon; 
11or to judfojaJ sales; nor to foreclo5nre saJes under deeds 'Jf 
trust securing debts; nor to the devolution of real estate by 
gift devise or inheritance; nor in any case jn whicb a deed., 
to a grantee is exempt from tJw State's recordation tax., 
Section 4. It shall be unlawful for any person, not exempt 
under the proYisions of section three hereof to acquise any 
1·eal estate situated in the City of Roanoke, or any interest 
therein, and thereafter fail to purchase, on or before the 
time the deed by which the property is conveyed to such per-
~on is offered for admission to record in the Clerk's Office 
of the Hustings Court of the City of Roanoke, stamps, in 
the requisite amount of .the tax imposed by this ordinance, 
and cause the stamps to be affixed to the deed of conveyance 
to him and cancelled in the manner prescribed by section two 
of this ordinance. 
Section 5. It shall be unlawful for any person to falsely 
or fraudulently make, forg·e, alter or counterfeit, or to pro-
cure or cause to be falsely made, forged, altered or counter-
feited, any stamp required by this ordinance, or 
page 7 } knowingly to fix, use, utter, publish, or tender a~ 
true, any fals"e, altered, forged or counterfeit stamp, 
or to affix or use any stamp or stamps previously used. 
Section 6. .The tax imposed by this ordinance shall be cu-
mulative, and shall be in addition to all other taxes levied 
and collected by the City of Roanoke. 
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Section 7. It shall be the duty of the delinquent tax col-
lector to inspect, at least. once each calendar month, all deeds 
of bargain and sale admitted to record in the ·clerk's office,. 
not previously inspected by him, to determine what violations 
of this ordinance, if any, have been committed; and if the 
delinquent tax collector has cause to believe any such viola-
tions have occurred, it shall be his duty to make complaint 
and cause s~ch persons to be sununoned to appear before 
the Civil and Police· Justice's Court to answer such com-
plaint. 
Section 8. The word "person" for the purpose of this or-
dinance, shall mean any individual, corporation, company, 
association, firm, or any group of individuals acting as a 
unit •. 
Section 9. no· ailino- to com 1 wit 
any of the provi£ions Qf this or!J(qanc4l__§,.h.qll _hjl f 1 ty_ <:>f a, 
misdemeanor, and ]I>J>JJ can,cictiou _theJ;efox,,,_:sli._aIT~iWJ.· J!?. 
io a :fine 0£ not:,tess than tjM) da1lars ~.cu;,.~_than_,,_~-~~ 
drea cfollars, or imprisonment for a period of not more than 
three months, or within the discretion of the court, · to both 
such :fine and iinp1isonment. Such conviction shall 
page 8 } not relieve any such person from the payment of 
the tax. 
Section 10. If any part of this ordinance ~hall for any 
reason be adjudged invalid by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, such invalidity shall not affect the parts which are not 
so adjudged invalid. 
An emergency existing, this ordinance shall be in force 
from its passage. 
( 2) Section 1 of Chapter 17 of the City Code, as amended 
on the 28th day of December, 1942, is as follows: 
Pursuant to Section two, Subdivision one, of the Charter 
of the City of Roanoke there shall be levied annually upon · 
all real estate and improvements thereon, and upon all tangible 
personal property, and machinery in the· City not exempt 
from taxation by law, a .tax of two dollars and fifty cents on 
every one hundred dollars of assessed value tl1creof, for the 
support of the city government, the payment of interest upon 
the city debt, support of a public library, the payment of 
pensions to Confederate soldiers, sailors and marines and 
their widows, for school purposes and other municipal ex-
penses. 
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(3) After the passage of ordinance No. 9035, the defendant 
purchased certain real estate in the City of Roanoke and 
·failed to pay tlJe tax imposed on the transaction by said Or-
dinance No. 9035, in the amount, and at the time, and in the 
manner therein pr~scribed. The required tax of $113.00 on 
said transaction is still unpaid. 
(4) The defendant is a veteran of World War II, having 
served in the Armed Forces of the United States until his 
discharge therefrom. Said real estate was purchased · 
page 9 } by l1im for a home, and was encumbered to secure 
what is commonly known as a "G. I. Loan", which 
is a type of financing provided by the Congress to assist 
veterans in the acquisition of homes for themselves. (Said 
city, although admitting the truth of the foregoing state-
ments in this paragraph contained, says that they are incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in this case 
and objects to any consideration thereof, because veterans 
occupy no favored class status in matters of this kind.) 
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CITY OF ROANOKE VIRGINIA, 
By C. E. HUNTER, 
Its Attorney. 
HAROLD JOSEPH DONCKERS, 
By H .. 1VI. MOOMAW, 
By W. COURTNEY KING, 
His Attorneys. 
COURT'S OPINION. 
This is in fact a test case to determine the validity of an 
ordinance adopted bv the Council of the City of Roanoke, 
April 28, 1947, undei· which, briefly, a tax was levied upon 
the sale or exchange of real estate in the City, to be paid by 
the grantee at the time of the recordation of the deed. The 
ordiiiance provides a punishment for failure to pay the tax 
levied and the appellant, Donckers, lrnving recorded a deed 
conveying property t? him and f ailin$' to l?ay the ~a~ pro-
vided for by the ordmance, was convicted m the q1yil and 
Police Justice's Court of Roanoke, and appealed to this Court. 
Counsel for the appellant, Donckers, assign many grounds 
upon which they conte11d the ordinance is invalid. In the 
view I take of this case it is unnecessary to pass upon all 
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the questions raised by the appellant.. In my opinion, the 
pivotal question in the case is whether the tax places an un-
equal burden on certain real estate and whether this amount~ 
to a violation of the rule requiring uniformity of taxation. 
The State of Virginia for many years. has exacted a tax-, 
payable upon the recordation of deeds, for the privilege of 
obtaining the benefits and advantage·s of the registration 
laws of the state. Counsel for the City admits that the tax 
under the ordinance is not a privilege tax, stating in bis brief 
that '' it is not claimed by the city that the tax in 
page 11 } question is a privilege tax. The tax is on a trans-
action, to-wit, the sale of real estate, and not on 
the right· to purchase· or own property". Consequently, it 
seems proper to assume that the taxpayer would obtain no 
benefit or privilege whatever by payment of the tax required 
by this ordinance. 
Many authorities are cited in briefs of counsel with ref er-
ence to the various contentions made, but when carefully 
studied few have any real bearing on the case under consid-
eration . 
. / The case most directly in point is that of Dawson v. Ken-
V tucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company, 255 U. S. 288. 
In. that case the State of Kentucky imposed a tax on all whis-
key in bonded warehouses withdrawn from bond within the 
state or transferred in bond to a point outside th_e state. The 
United States Supreme Court held that this was not a tax 
on a privilege but was a tax on the property itself and since 
it was not uniform upon all property of the same class it was 
an invalid tax. This language is used in the opinion written 
by Judge Brandeis and the same reasoning seems to apply 
to this case : 
''Nor is the alleged business of merely owning and storing 
whiskey in bond made taxable. So long as the whiskey is 
stored in bond within the state, it is free of the tax. One may 
own and store the whiskey for years in the hope of selling it, 
at a profit and yet be free from any obligation ever to pay 
this tax, if, before its removal from bond within 
page 12 ~ the state, the whiskey is sold to another, or if, 
while .so owned, it is destroyed or forfeited to the 
governm~nt. To levy a tax by reason of ownership of prop-, 
erty is to tax the property." . 
In .applying tbe above rule to the case under considera-
tio:q, the aptness of the above statement becomes more ap-
City of Roanoke v. Harold ,Joseph Donckers 49 
parent when it is realized that so long as real estate is not 
transferred by sale or exchange no tax becomes payable un-
der the ordinance. · 
In the case of Thonipson v. lY!cLeod, 73 So. 193, ad valorem 
taxes were assessed by the State of l\Iississippi on all real 
property aud the standing trees thereon. ·while this tax law 
was still in effect, the legislature passed an act under .. which 
a tax was levied for each cup or box used in getting turpen-
tine from the pine trees growing on all lands within the state. 
The highest court of Mississippi held this was an additional 
direct tax on the land, that this amounted to double taxation 
and violated the rule as to equality and uniformity. The 
Court had this to say about this tax: 
'' ~ «i • if you tax the standing trees with an acl valorem 
tax, and at the same time exact tribute from the owner as a 
condition precedent to his right to lay hands upon the tree, 
the state is imposing double taxation upon th~ tree itself. 
Our Constitution solemnly declares that 'taxation shall be 
uniform and equal throughout the state' and that 
page 13 ~ 'property shall be taxed in proportion to its value'. 
If the tax here questioned can lawfully be imposed, 
then. the Legislature of our state, in a desperate search for 
revenue, can effectually brush aside the essential feature of 
equality and uniformity demanded by the Constitution. The 
provision that property shall be taxed in proportion. to its 
value would be nullified, and the integrity of the Constitution 
itself destroyed.'' · 
. The case in Virginia that seems more nearly in point than 
any other is Iia1wpton v. bisura.n.ce Company of North 
America., etc., 177 Va. 494, 14 (2) S. E. 396. In that case 
the City of Hampton adopted an Ordinance levying a tax on 
· fire insurance companies for the benefit of what it designated 
as a "Fireman's Relief Fund", which was to be created for 
the relief of firemen of that city injured or disabled, or the 
dependents of such as might lose their lives, under certain 
circumstances. It is true that this ordinance was declared 
invalid because the tax imposed was not levied for public pur-
poses but this language is used in that opinion: 
'' * «i * if inequality and want of uniformity in the burden 
it imposes are stamped upon the face of-the law, the law 
must be pronounced invalid. 
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'The constitutional requisite of uniformity of 
page 14 ~ taxation means that all property of the same class 
shall be taxed alike. There is a quotation from 
Mills' Political Economy, which is this : 
" 'Equality of taxation means apportioning the contribu-
tion of each person towards the expense of -government so 
that he shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from 
his share of the payment than every other person experi-
ences.' '' 
"To any extent t~at one man is compelled to pay in order 
to relieve others of a public burden properly resting upon 
them, his property is taken for private purposes, as plainly 
and palpably as it would be if appropriated to the payment 
of the debts or the discharge of obligations which the per-
son thus relieved by his payments might owe to private par-
ties." 
Applying the reasoning of the above statements to this 
case, it seems clear that there is not that uniformity of taxa-
tion required by Section 168 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
The conclusion I reach from the authorities is this: The 
tax under the ordinance is a property tax, and since an ad 
valore1n tax is assessed for each year ag·ainst all real estate 
in Roanoke City by the City of Roanoke and as the tax (un-
der · the ordinance) is not chargeable against all owners of 
real estate in the City, but only against those recording in a 
particular year deeds of purchase or exchange, 
page 15 ~ the ordinance violates the rule as to uniformity 
and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. 
This bein~ a criminal proceeding, an 01·der will be entered 
dismissing tne charges against the appellant. 
DIRK A. KUYK. 
pag·e 16 ~ And at another day, to-wit: On the third day 
of October, 1947, the following order was entered: 
This day came the Attorney for the City of Roanoke, Vir-
ginia, and Harold Joseph Donckers the defendant, in obedi-
. ence to his recognizance and plead not guilty to the charge 
that he did acquire by purchase real estate in the City of 
Roanoke, known as Lot four (4) Block Two (2) Section One 
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(1) Rosaland Hills, and thereafter did unlawfully fail to pay, 
on or before May 13, 1947, the date the deed conveying said 
real estate to him was offered for record in the Clerk's Of-
fice, the tax required on said sale, to-wit, $113.00, and did 
·fail to purchase and affix to said deed, the stamps evidencing 
the pa;yment of the afor.esaid tax, in violation of ordinance 
~ o. 9035 of the City of Roanoke imposing said tax, alleged 
m the warrant, and with the consent of the Attorney for the 
City of Roanoke and for said def etidant a jury was waived 
and dlspensed with, and thereupon the Attorneys for the City 
of Roanoke and the defendant, by consent :filed an agreement 
stipulating in writing the facts in the case, which is made a 
part of the record in the case. 
Tb~reupon the Court heard argument of counsel as to the 
guilt of the defendant, and the validity of said ordinance, 
and after due consideration of the facts and arguments of 
counsel, was of the opinion that said ordinance is unconstitu-
tional and invalid for the reasons set forth in its written 
opinion, which opinion, is ordered :filed and mad~ 
page 17 ~ a part of the record in this case. 
It is therefore considered by the Court that the 
said Harold Joseph Donckers be discharged of said alleged 
offense and that he go hence without day, to which action of 
the Court the City of Roanoke by counsel then and there ex-
cepted, on the ground that the Court erred in declaring in-
valid and unconstitutional said ordinance~ and said city sig-
nifying its intention to apply to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virgfoia for a writ of error and supersedeas to the 
judgment of this court, execution on said judgment is sus-
pended for a period of sixty days to enable said City of Roa-
noke to prepare and :file its bill of exception. 
I have seen this order. 
. C. E. HUNTE.R, 
Atty. for City of Roanoke. 
H. M. MOOMAW, 
Atty. for Defendant. 
page 18 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Roanoke. 
I, R. J. ·watson, Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Roanoke, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is 
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a true, correct and complete transcript of the record in the 
case of City of Roanoke against Harold Joseph Donckers, 
lately determined by said Court. I further certify that notice 
of the application for this transcript has been duly given to 
Counsel for the defendant, as required by law. 
Given under my hand this the 29th day of November, 1947. 
R. J. WATSON, Clerk. 
Fee for transcript, $5.00. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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